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BUYER BEWARE: VARIATION AND OPACITY IN ESG 
AND ESG INDEX FUNDS 
Dana Brakman Reiser and Anne Tucker† 
Evidence of the tremendous rise in the significance of environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) investing is coming from all quarters. Fund flows into ESG 
investment vehicles are growing at a sustained and sometimes exponential pace. Fund 
complexes are rushing to design products, creating and rebranding scores of mutual 
funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs), including lower-cost indexed options. 
Industry leaders, critics, and commentators are all heralding the sea change as a shift 
in investing—and corporate governance—to more broadly consider environmental 
and social factors.  
This Article provides vital context for this conversation. Its descriptive account 
of the ESG investment landscape drawn from hand-collected 2018–2019 data on a 
sample of active and passive ESG and traditional funds documents great variation in 
their investment strategies, portfolios, voting records, and fees. The underlying 
variation across funds, however, is largely opaque to consumers—who rely on the ESG 
acronym at their peril. Building on our case study, we examine the supply and demand 
side drivers fueling ESG market growth, variation, and opacity, and explore 
†  Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State College of 
Law. The authors thank Steven Dean, Sean Griffith, Claire Kelly, and Henry Shilling for their 
insights on drafts of this Article, and Christopher Kanelos, Joshua Hamlet, Sacha Sellam, and 
Joshua Roye for invaluable research assistance. 
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mechanisms to better match high-ESG committed investors to high-ESG committed 
funds, including enhanced transparency and regulation of intermediaries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing—
investment strategies that incorporate the environmental, social, and 
governance practices of investee firms in portfolio composition and 
management—grew by leaps and bounds in the last decade. At the start 
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of 2020, the market offered investors roughly 300 ESG funds1—a subset 
of the more broadly defined sustainable funds.2 This number represents 
huge growth (considering there were ninety “sustainable” funds in 
2014).3 Fund growth in this area outpaces growth in traditional mutual 
fund and exchange traded fund (ETF) markets. ESG funds manage 
increasingly large pools of capital. After several years of growth, in 2018 
ESG funds gained $5.5 billion assets under management (AUM).4 In 
2019, ESG inflows shattered prior records reaching over $20 billion5—
growth in large part attributable to re-branding of existing funds into ESG 
products.6 
   1  John Hale, Sustainable Fund Flows in 2019 Smash Previous Records, MORNINGSTAR (Jan. 10, 
2020), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/961765/sustainable-fund-flows-in-2019-smash-
previous-records [https://perma.cc/PS7X-F37X]; see also MORNINGSTAR, SUSTAINABLE FUNDS U.S. 
LANDSCAPE REPORT 1 (2020) [hereinafter MORNINGSTAR 2020] (“After having steadily gained 
prominence over the past decade, sustainable investing appears to be reaching a tipping point. For 
evidence, one need look no further than the nearly fourfold increase in assets that flowed into 
sustainable funds in the United States in 2019.”). 
2 “While the definition of sustainable investing continues to evolve, this refers to a range of 
overarching investing approaches or strategies that encompass values-based investing, negative 
screening (exclusions), thematic and impact investing, ESG integration, company engagement and 
proxy voting. These are not mutually exclusive.” A Decade of Sustainable Funds Investing: 10 
Years/10 Charts, SUSTAINABLE INVESTING, https://www.sustainableinvest.com/sustainable-
investing-decade [https://perma.cc/24BX-9U6C]. 
 3 See MORNINGSTAR, SUSTAINABLE FUNDS U.S. LANDSCAPE REPORT 3, 6 (2018), 
https://cdn.ymaws.com/dciia.org/resource/collection/8606CD14-06A5-4277-9507-
C397C1C8DEA0/Sustainable_Funds_Landscape_013018.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z5V-ATGU]. 
 4 MORNINGSTAR 2020, supra note 1, at 14 (noting a $5.5 billion in net flows in 2018 to 
sustainable funds); see also MORNINGSTAR, SUSTAINABLE FUNDS U.S. LANDSCAPE REPORT 11–12 
(2018), https://cdn.ymaws.com/dciia.org/resource/collection/8606CD14-06A5-4277-9507-
C397C1C8DEA0/Sustainable_Funds_Landscape_013018.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z5V-ATGU]. 
“Investor interest in ESG funds, alongside market appreciation, drove a 37% annual increase in 
assets to $445 billion in 2017.” Sustainable Investing Grows on Pensions, Millennials, BLOOMBERG 
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/sustainable-investing-grows-
pensions-millennials [https://perma.cc/LDW5-75AK]. 
 5  MORNINGSTAR 2020, supra note 1 (reporting “flows into sustainable funds totaled $21.4 
billion in 2019”). 
 6  See A Decade of Sustainable Funds Investing: 10 Years/10 Charts, supra note 2; 
MORNINGSTAR 2020, supra note 1 (“In 2019, 30 new funds launched (plus one in late December 
2018 that did not make it into last year’s report) and 11 existing conventional funds were 
repurposed as sustainable funds.”). 
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ESG markets, like the U.S. fund market more generally, frequently 
incorporate passive strategies.7 Passively managed funds compose about 
a third of the sustainable funds market.8 No longer a niche or specialty 
area, ESG investing today is massive. Global ESG assets under 
management reached $30 trillion in 2019.9 
This transformation can be seen not only in ballooning fund options 
and AUM but also in the dramatic shift in the conversation around the 
contours of investing and corporate governance. Investment industry 
leaders like State Street and BlackRock are issuing commitments to use 
ESG factors to build and manage investment portfolios.10 Those leading 
 7 Passive management refers to the practice of building a fund portfolio to match an external 
index or set of rules for firm inclusion and retention, such as funds with portfolios constructed to 
match the S&P 500 or Russell 3000 indexes of companies. See Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of 
the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial 
Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 298–99 (2017). Passive contrasts with active management, under which 
fund managers select investments for inclusion and retention in a fund portfolio based on their 
own research and predictions about the investment’s quality and fitness for a fund. See id. at 299. 
As passive strategies require far less research and ongoing assessment, they are associated with 
lower fees. See id. at 302. Passive investment strategies are rising in popularity in large part because, 
net of fees, on aggregate they tend to match or outperform active alternatives. See id. For statistics 
on the size and growth of passive investing, see generally id. and see also infra notes 48–52. 
 8 See MORNINGSTAR 2020, supra note 1 (reporting 2019 numbers); Reshma Kapadia, 
Sustainable Funds’ Big Divide: Active vs. Passive Investing, BARRON’S (Feb. 7, 2020, 2:35 PM), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/sustainable-funds-big-divide-active-vs-passive-investing-
51581104128 [https://perma.cc/HFS5-6LFN]. 
 9  Pippa Stevens, Your Complete Guide to Investing with a Conscience, a $30 Trillion Market 
Just Getting Started, CNBC (Dec. 14, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/14/your-
complete-guide-to-socially-responsible-investing.html [https://perma.cc/4HZC-FLJ5]; see 
Sustainable Investing Grows on Pensions, Millennials, supra note 4 (noting that global estimates 
include investments “labeled as sustainable, responsible or ethical investing” and amounted to $23 
trillion in prior years and citing to estimates provided by the Global Sustainable Investment 
Alliance). 
10  See, e.g., Letter from Cyrus Taraporevala, President & Chief Exec. Officer, State St. Glob. 
Advisors, to Board Members, State St. Glob. Advisors (Jan. 28, 2020), 
https://www.ssga.com/library-content/pdfs/insights/CEOs-letter-on-SSGA-2020-proxy-voting-
agenda.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3XE-TSDT] (announcing State Street’s plan “to use our proxy 
voting power to ensure companies are identifying material ESG issues and incorporating the 
implications into their long-term strategy”); Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman & Chief Exec. 
Officer, BlackRock, to Chief Executive Officers, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance (Jan. 2020), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/
C7TG-39BJ]; see also Robert G. Eccles & Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, HARV. BUS. 
REV., May–June 2019, at 106 (reporting broad agreement among top executives across global 
investment companies and asset owners that ESG issues are an important component in evaluating 
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some of the largest portfolio companies have likewise signaled a shift to 
support stakeholder—rather than shareholder only—focused 
governance.11 The Big Four accounting firms and corporate members of 
World Economic Forum pledged to develop metrics for corporate 
reporting on ESG issues.12 While there are those who challenge the 
ascendance of stakeholderism and ESG,13 many prominent 
commentators are broadcasting strong support for the shift as key to 
long-term investing.14  
In this brave new world where investment and corporate titans tout 
ESG strategies, investors appear able to secure an enticing combination 
of traditional investment objectives and far more ambitious ones. In 
addition to savings or wealth building, ESG products are intended to 
combat the risks posed by poor governance practices that threaten the 
stability of capital markets and the economy writ large. They are also 
intended to counter the existential threats posed by social inequality and 
climate change. But the substance of environmental, social, and 
governance considerations in ESG investing is essentially unregulated. 
Merely flagging the use of ESG factors satisfies securities regulation 
disclosure mandates but does little to illuminate for investors how a 
long-term investments); supra notes 225–233 and accompanying text (discussing BlackRock’s 
evolution on this issue over the past few years). 
 11  See Our Commitment, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/
ourcommitment [perma.cc/Y7QD-F33X] (“[M]odernizing its principles on the role of the 
corporation” to clarify that “[e]ach of our stakeholders is essential[] . . . [and] commit[ting] to 
deliver[ing] value to all of them, for the future success of our companies, our communities and our 
country”). 
 12 See Press Release, World Econ. F., Measuring Stakeholder Capitalism: World’s Largest Cos. 




 13 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 
CORNELL L. REV. (Dec. 2020) (arguing the shift to stakeholderism will decrease both board 
accountability and pressure for regulatory reforms necessary to better protect stakeholders). 
  14 See, e.g., Martin Lipton et al., Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2020, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Dec. 10, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/10/thoughts-for-boards-
of-directors-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/3QGQ-T3UW] (arguing corporate leaders should be 
“focusing not just on profits, but also on the corporation’s broader purpose and role in the 
economic and societal ecosystem in order to build a sustainable and long-term value proposition”); 
Editorial Bd., Investors Should Look Beyond the Bottom Line, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/30b3b8d2-f014-11e9-ad1e-4367d8281195. 
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particular investment product will use these factors or how to assess 
whether it has done so effectively. In non-ESG investing, profit, income, 
and growth have consistent meanings across products, so their disclosure 
alone allows investors to make useful comparisons between them. In 
contrast, what qualifies as ESG performance is unclear and contested. 
Mere disclosure that a fund practices ESG investing will do little to 
unpack these terms for investors.   
To unpack ESG in practice, we conduct a case study of ESG 
investment practices among “top” funds in 2018–2019 and compare it 
against non-ESG products in the same fund family. In doing so, we 
observe two contrasts: ESG versus non-ESG investments and the 
variation between ESG funds. In our review, we find that ESG 
transactions are not standardized. There is, in fact, great variation in ESG 
strategies, holdings, voting practices, and fees. Further, on the matter of 
holdings and voting, not all ESG funds are distinguishable from non-ESG 
funds. The ESG implementation continuum is not facially evident to 
investing consumers and it is hard to unearth. As two experienced 
researchers, we poured over filings and third-party sites to observe 
glimpses of ESG in practice. With our case study, we first confirm non-
standardization within the ESG market and then provide a descriptive 
account of the ESG market drivers and the consequences of opaque ESG. 
We conclude that investors generally get the ESG that they pay for, 
meaning that high-fee, niche funds have more ESG differentiated 
holdings and voting patterns. High fees alone, however, do not signal a 
good ESG return per se. High fees and niche products alone, simply 
provide an ordering mechanism within our sample. Confusion around 
ESG implementation creates barriers to high-ESG-committed investors 
willing to pay so that their capital can support greater ESG impact firms, 
not just Disney, Amazon, and JP Morgan as many generalist funds do. 
Existing securities laws provide no remedy. Other possible sources 
of regulation to define and regularize the ESG concept likewise provide 
little insight to investors. The Department of Labor (DOL) can function 
as a kind of shadow securities regulator through its oversight of ERISA-
governed plans.15 Its limited guidance on ESG investing, though, is a 
fairly foreboding warning—ERISA fiduciaries may engage in ESG 
 15 See Anita K. Krug, The Other Securities Regulator: A Case Study in Regulatory Damage, 92 
TUL. L. REV. 339, 350–56 (2017) (describing the DOL’s overlapping jurisdiction with the SEC in an 
article criticizing the former’s 2016 rule designating securities brokers as fiduciaries under ERISA). 
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investing (whatever that may be) but they are reminded that they cannot 
do so in any way that would sacrifice returns for beneficiaries. This 
cautionary instruction does nothing to help delineate the ESG 
marketplace for investors or product creators. ESG investing has evolved 
in a relative legal vacuum.  
The rise of passive ESG investing adds another dimension to the 
puzzle. When funds double down on enticing promises of low-fee, guilt-
free retirement, how can investors separate fact from fiction? Further, 
passive ESG necessarily relies on the proliferation of ESG indices and 
other metrics against which these funds construct their portfolios. An 
ESG index fund cannot be launched without an ESG index to track. The 
content of ESG indices could be subjected to regulation, which would 
indirectly regulate ESG investment products. But while indices have 
become hugely influential in the market, they are currently developed as 
proprietary systems by private companies and exist entirely outside the 
reach of the U.S. financial regulatory architecture.16 Passive products thus 
further obscure ESG implementation. To consider these consequences as 
well, we include a passive ESG sample in our study, creating a comparison 
between passive and active ESG, as well as with non-ESG funds.   
In all comparisons, we conclude that the ESG label acts more as a 
product signal and branding mechanism than it does a promise of a 
specific investment strategy or avoided externalities. After concluding 
that the ESG market signal alone is not enough to match high-ESG 
commitment investors to high ESG funds—an idea consistent with 
current literature accounts in law and finance,17 we explore regulatory 
 16 See Fast Answers: Market Indices, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/
answersindiceshtm.html [https://perma.cc/RA63-3YAR] (stating “[t]he SEC does not regulate the 
content of these indices and is not endorsing those described here”). 
 17 Paul Brest, Ronald J. Gilson, and Mark A. Wolfson introduce a taxonomy of socially-
motivated investors (neutral, values aligned, and value creation) to address their concerns that 
funds use imprecise and misleading terminology to describe social investments with the implied 
consequence of misdirecting socially-motivated capital. Paul Brest et al., How Investors Can (and 
Can’t) Create Social Value (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 394/2018, 2018). Brad 
M. Barber, Adair Morse, and Ayako Yasuda, in their paper Impact Investing, document investors’
willingness to pay for social/environmental returns in the form of reduced financial returns and
also note a range of “willingness-to-pay” among heterogenous investors. Brad Barber et al., Impact 
Investing (Dec. 12, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2705556 
[https://perma.cc/NQ7Z-6F6P]. A third impact investing article also discusses the range of investor 
and fund commitment to social benefit returns and the difficulty of matching highly-committed 
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and market solutions. Our work contributes to existing scholarship on 
ESG investing18 and builds upon prior scholarly debates over corporate 
purpose,19 corporate social (and environmental) responsibility,20 and 
sustainable investing.21  
Part I details how ESG investing has been operationalized, focusing 
closely on the new trend of passive ESG and the special challenges it 
raises. A key contribution of this Part is its compilation of data drawn 
investors to highly-committed funds, a problem partially addressed in private markets through 
contracts. Christopher Geczy et al., Contracts with (Social) Benefits: The Implementation of Impact 
Investing 23 (July 1, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3159731 
[https://perma.cc/LE56-RA7W]. 
 18 See e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring 
Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647 (2016) (advocating for the realignment of long-term firm 
value, ESG, and regulatory goals); Susan N. Gary, Values and Value: University Endowments, 
Fiduciary Duties, and ESG Investing, 42 J.C. & U.L. 247 (2016) (investigating alignment of fiduciary 
duties and ESG investing); Florian Berg et al., Aggregate Confusion: The Divergence of ESG Ratings 
(MIT Sloan Sch. Working Paper No. 5822-19, 2019) (documenting divergence of ESG rating scores 
and the variation of constituent metrics). For a literature review of ESG and related scholarship, see 
Deborah Burand & Anne Tucker, Legal Literature Review of Social Entrepreneurship and Impact 
Investing (2007-2017): Doing Good by Doing Business, 11 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2019). 
 19 See, e.g., Malcolm S. Salter, Rehabilitating Corporate Purpose (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working 
Paper No. 19-104, 2019) (arguing for a definition of corporate purpose that is “established moral 
and economic principles that challenge those underlying the shareholder value maximization 
doctrine”); Afra Afsharipour, Redefining Corporate Purpose: An International Perspective, 40 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 465 (2017) (analyzing the Indian Companies Act, drawing comparisons, and 
identifying lessons for corporate law); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW 
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012) 
(questing shareholder value as the predominant measure of corporate purpose and proposing 
alternatives). 
 20 See, e.g., Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, The Virtuous Corporation: On Corporate Social Motivation 
and the Law, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 341 (2017) (creating a taxonomy for corporate social motivations); 
Jacob Park & Sonia Kowal, Socially Responsible Investing 3.0: Understanding Finance and 
Environmental, Social, and Governance Issues in Emerging Markets, 18 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 17 
(2013) (declaring a “third stage of socially responsible investing” where SRI is a “market reality” in 
emerging economies); Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Boards and New Environmentalism, 31 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 291 (2007) (noting the increasing business case for corporate 
managers to care about environmental impact and risks). 
21 See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty & Quentin Karpilow, Harnessing Investor Interest in Sustainability: 
The Next Frontier in Environmental Information Regulation, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 625 (2019) 
(advocating for mandatory corporate ESG disclosure to facilitate realignment of capital markets 
with sustainability principles); Meir Statman, ESG as Waving Banners and as Pulling Plows, 46 J. 
PORTFOLIO MGMT. ETHICAL INVESTING 16 (2020) (creating a behavioral finance taxonomy of ESG 
investors and expectations); Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New 
Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987 (2009) (harmonizing sustainability goals 
and corporate governance). 
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from a study of the operations of thirty-one actively- and passively-
managed ESG funds and seven non-ESG comparators, pulling data from 
2018–2019. In an attempt to discern whether ESG funds are doing 
something consistent—and consistently different from non-ESG funds—
and whether their actions likely align with investor expectations, we 
hand-collect the investment strategy disclosures, fees, portfolio holdings, 
shareholder proposal voting records, and tracking errors for each of these 
funds. Our results confirm that the ESG label alone conveys little 
information to investors; fund operations vary widely among ESG funds 
and often overlap with those of non-ESG funds.  
As legal regulation only weakly confines ESG investment activity, 
the next two Parts turn to the force that is driving its growth and 
implementation: the market. Part II focuses on the role of demand in the 
growth of the field. Recognizing that ESG investors with different goals 
(and subject to different regulatory regimes) will have varying appetites 
for ESG products, this Part maps the contours of the contributions of 
individual and various types of institutional investors to ESG demand. 
Part III then turns to the supply side, the role of which has thus far gone 
largely unexplored and underappreciated. We identify the considerable 
incentives that investment product creators—fund complexes and index 
providers in particular—have to expand their ESG investing footprints. 
The collective takeaway of these Parts exposes serious gaps between 
reality and the reasonable expectations of investors and society about the 
capacity of ESG investing to solve social problems. Those gaps are 
barriers to matching high ESG-committed investors to high ESG funds.  
Part IV returns to the question of regulation. It first considers how 
market forces may shift to incentivize greater accountability and 
consistency in ESG investment products. Then it sketches the potential 
legal paths securities regulation, ERISA law, and regulation of index 
providers might follow to narrow the gap between ESG investor 
expectations and reality to facilitate better matching. It also offers 
recommendations for future research. 
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I. ESG INVESTING EXPLORED
A. Introduction to ESG Investing
ESG investing has longstanding roots, spanning examples as diverse 
as the limitations placed on investment under Sharia law, John Wesley’s 
instructions for his followers to avoid stocks that conflicted with 
Methodist religious teachings, and the environmental and South African 
divestment movements.22 Early iterations of socially-inflected mutual 
fund offerings often screened out “sin” stocks, such as equity in 
companies that produced alcohol, armaments, or tobacco.23 These 
exclusionary (or “negative”) screen investment products have been 
available for decades. Until recently, however, they attracted only a niche 
audience of highly-committed investors, as the business case for such 
investing was, at best, unclear.   
Exclusionary screens’ necessary diversification limits raise concerns 
that using these strategies to incorporate ESG factors in investment will 
reduce financial returns. Many studies have borne out these concerns.24 
Others find negative screening can be deployed without lowering risk-
adjusted returns,25 however; and negative screening continues to be an 
 22 See Lloyd Kurtz, Socially Responsible Investment and Shareholder Activism, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 249, 249–55 (Andrew Crane et al. eds. 2008). 
 23 See Casey C. Clark & Andy Kirkpatrick, Impact Investing Under the Uniform Prudent Investor 
Act, 32 PROB. & PROP. 32, 33 (2018). 
 24 See, e.g., Pieter Jan Trinks & Bert Scholtens, The Opportunity Cost of Negative Screening in 
Socially Responsible Investing, 140 J. BUS. ETHICS 193 (2017) (testing a wide variety of negative 
screens and finding they frequently result in underperformance); Samuel A. Mueller, The 
Opportunity Cost of Discipleship: Ethical Mutual Funds and Their Returns, 52 SOC. ANALYSIS 111 
(1991) (finding nine out of ten mutual funds negatively screened for compliance with ethical 
restrictions underperformed the market). 
25  See Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and ESG Integration, 90 
U. COLO. L. REV. 731, 752 (2019) (pointing to “two metastudies conclud[ing] that funds using
negative screens are more likely to show neutral rather than negative or positive performance when 
compared to non-SRI benchmarks”); ALEXANDER MONK, SCHRODERS, DEMYSTIFYING NEGATIVE
SCREENS: THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF ESG EXCLUSIONS (2017) (explaining that screening methods 
vary widely and many need not have significant negative impacts on long-term performance,
particularly in the actively managed context). 
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important component of ESG investing today.26 For example, the 
Vanguard FTSE Social Index excludes “weapons, tobacco, gambling, 
alcohol, adult entertainment, and nuclear power” companies.27 New 
funds utilizing negative screens also continue to come online. In the wake 
of the Parkland school shootings, fund giant BlackRock offered 
institutional investors the ability to exclude gun stocks from their 
portfolios and created gun-free ETFs.28 
Numerous other strategies have also been developed to incorporate 
ESG factors in investing, including both active and passive approaches to 
composing portfolios of high performing ESG companies. Some active 
funds practice full integration, considering ESG factors as part of the 
valuation process for every investment decision.29 For example, at the 
Morgan Stanley Institutional Global Opportunity Fund the “investment 
process integrates analysis of sustainability with respect to disruptive 
change, financial strength, environmental and social externalities and 
 26 See Stuart Kirk, How ESG Can Have Unintended Consequences, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/e32bb67e-ebc9-3407-a83b-b2524a688222 [https://perma.cc/W6EE-
PC2Q] (“Stock screening is by far the most popular way to invest based on ESG principles, 
accounting for more than three-quarters of responsibly managed assets globally.”) 
27 Vanguard FTSE Soc. Index Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Dec. 3, 2018). 
 28 See Leslie P. Norton, BlackRock’s Larry Fink: The New Conscience of Wall Street?, FIN. NEWS 
LONDON (June 26, 2018, 7:47 AM), https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/blackrocks-larry-fink-the-
new-conscience-of-wall-street-20180626 [https://perma.cc/29B8-S43Q]. As a major index fund 
provider, these new funds did not dislodge BlackRock as a large investor in weapons companies, 
including the manufacturer of the gun used at Parkland. Negative screens are incompatible with a 
pure index strategy, though BlackRock and other index fund providers have pledged to engage with 
gun manufacturers on issues raised by mass shootings. See, e.g., Matt Levine, BlackRock Ends up in 
an Awkward Place on Guns, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 8, 2018, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-08/larry-fink-s-blackrock-ends-up-in-an-
awkward-place-on-guns [https://perma.cc/328J-JM48]; Liz Moyer, Student Activist David Hogg 
Calls for Boycott of Vanguard and Blackrock over Gunmaker Ownership, CNBC (Apr. 17, 2018, 5:00 
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/17/student-activist-david-hogg-calls-for-boycott-of-
vanguard-and-blackrock-over-gunmaker-ownership.html [https://perma.cc/3TZ5-JBJY] (noting 
some activists’ calls to boycott BlackRock and other index fund providers). 
29 See Amir Amel-Zadeh & George Serafeim, Why and How Investors Use ESG Information: 
Evidence from a Global Survey, 74 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 87, 93–95 (2018) (finding 34.4% of investors in 
the survey used full integration; again, U.S. investors lagged Europeans, with only 27.1% of the 
former using engagement strategies, and 48.1% of the latter); Robert G. Eccles et al., How to 
Integrate ESG into Investment Decision-Making: Results of a Global Survey of Institutional Investors, 
29 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 125, 125–26 (2017) (finding only twenty-one percent utilized this strategy 
in a global study of asset owners and managers). 
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governance.”30 Other active ESG strategies require portfolio companies 
to post minimum performance on ESG factors for inclusion in a fund or 
include leading ESG companies in a fund to tilt its overall composition in 
that direction.31 Still others develop thematic ESG investment products 
like clean energy, water, or other specialized investment funds. The AB 
Sustainable Global Thematic A Fund, for example, “identifies sustainable 
investment themes that are broadly consistent with achieving the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals.”32 Passive ESG funds rely on 
specially-designed ESG or sustainability indices to build their offerings, 
and will be discussed in more detail in Section I.B.   
In addition to using various strategies to incorporate ESG factors 
into investment selection, ESG funds also practice engagement.33 They 
utilize their power as shareholders—to vote for directors, on fundamental 
transactions and shareholder proposals, make shareholder proposals, and 
more informal efforts to influence management—to drive ESG changes 
in investee companies.34 To some degree, as most ESG funds are 
composed of equity securities,35 they cannot help engaging as they are 
called upon to vote their shares. Many ESG fund sponsors, however, see 
30 Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc., Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Apr. 30, 2018). 
 31 See Amel-Zadeh & Serafeim, supra note 29, at 93–95 (describing these strategies and 
reporting relatively lower levels of use than engagement and full integration, as reported by survey 
participants); Eccles et al., supra note 29, at 125–26 (reporting greater use of such techniques, thirty-
seven percent for best-in-class selection and twenty-nine percent for thematic investing, in a global 
study of asset owners and managers). 
32 AB Sustainable Glob. Thematic Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Oct. 31, 2018). 
33 See Amel-Zadeh & Serafeim, supra note 29, at 94–95 (finding 37.1% of global investors 
utilizing engagement strategies, though this finding was dominated by European investors; only 
27.1% of US investors reported using this strategy, while 40.2% still used negative screening; 48.1% 
of European investors in the study utilized engagement); Eccles et al., supra note 29, at 125–26 
(reporting twenty-one percent of respondents used engagement strategies in a global study of asset 
managers and asset owners who either implemented ESG investing already or planned to do so, 
while forty-seven percent used negative screening). 
 34 See Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Fund 
Voting Authority, 98 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 6–7) (on file with author) 
(describing the “rise of stewardship”). 
 35 See MORNINGSTAR 2020, supra note 1 (noting that while there is growth in fixed income 
sustainable funds, they still represent a relatively small slice of the market); see also MORNINGSTAR, 
PASSIVE SUSTAINABLE FUNDS: THE GLOBAL LANDSCAPE 5 (2018) [hereinafter MORNINGSTAR, 
PASSIVE SUSTAINABLE FUNDS], https://www.morningstar.com/lp/passive-esg-
landscape?cid=RED_RES0002 (noting “embryonic” stage of development of the passive sustainable 
fixed-income market). 
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engagement beyond voting as an important component of their ESG 
orientation.36 For example, Calvert, sponsor of several ESG funds in our 
sample, describes engagement as a key part of “how we’re different,” 
explaining that by “combining our proprietary research models with a 
structured corporate engagement framework, we work toward building 
sustainable long-term value in both the companies we invest in and our 
clients’ portfolios.”37 
Table 1 below illustrates different ESG investment strategies, as 
stated in funds’ investment strategy disclosures.  
Table 1: ESG Investment Strategies 
Category: ESG Scoring/ Screening Ex: Vanguard FTSE Social Index38 
ESG attributes of companies are scored and higher scoring companies are 
selected for investment or inclusion in an index. Conversely, non-ESG 
attributes (i.e., tobacco, armaments, etc.) may exclude a company from 
investment.  
Category: ESG Integration Ex: Morgan Stanley Inst. Global 
Opp.39 
Considering ESG factors as part of the valuation process for every investment 
decision.  
Category: ESG Active Governance Ex: Calvert Equity Fund40 
 36 Engagement also enables non-ESG branded funds to respond to ESG concerns in their 
investment portfolios. Indeed, engagement is likely to be the only available strategy for passive funds 
locked into non-ESG indexes to address ESG issues in their portfolios. 
 37 How We’re Different, CALVERT, https://www.calvert.com/how-we-are-different.php 
[https://perma.cc/VVK3-TN62]. 
38 Vanguard FTSE Soc. Index Fund, supra note 27.  
The Index is market-capitalization-weighted and includes primarily large- and mid-cap 
U.S. stocks that have been screened for certain criteria related to the environment, 
human rights, health and safety, labor standards, and diversity. The Index excludes 
companies . . . involved with weapons, tobacco, gambling, alcohol, adult entertainment, 
and nuclear power. 
Id. 
39 “The investment process integrates analysis of sustainability with respect to disruptive 
change, financial strength, environmental and social externalities and governance (also referred to 
as ESG).” Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc., supra note 30. 
 40 “[R]esearch is guided by The Calvert Principles for Responsible Investment, which provide 
a framework for considering environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) factors that may affect 
investment performance.” Calvert Equity Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Feb. 1, 2018). 
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Voting in support of ESG favorable resolutions through proxy voting, propose 
ESG favorable shareholder resolutions, and engage management on ESG 
related issues.  
Category: ESG Operationalized 
Portfolio Companies 
Ex: AB Sustainable Global Thematic 
A41 
ESG-focused theme such as clean water, clean energy, solar, or sustainable 
development goals.  
It still remains difficult to conduct industry-wide studies because 
ESG investing practices are so wide-ranging, and costs of utilizing these 
strategies can be high,42 but data showing ESG investing need not sacrifice 
returns—and indeed may increase them—is beginning to mount. Studies 
have found that incorporating a wide array of ESG investment strategies, 
like those identified above, outperforms negative screening alone.43 In a 
comparison of portfolios using ESG factors with non-ESG portfolios, the 
former often outperformed the latter, and provided lower volatility and 
risk.44 An influential study of firm performance also found that “firms 
with strong ratings on material sustainability topics outperform firms 
41 
The Adviser identifies sustainable investment themes that are broadly consistent with 
achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Examples of these themes 
may include energy transformation, resource preservation, equality and opportunity, 
and improving human health and safeguarding lives, and the themes are expected to 
change over time based on the Adviser’s research. In addition to this “top-down” 
thematic approach, the Adviser also uses a “bottom-up” analysis of individual 
companies, focusing on prospective earnings growth, valuation, and quality of company 
management and on evaluating a company’s exposure to environmental, social and 
corporate governance (“ESG”) factors. 
AB Sustainable Glob. Thematic Fund, supra note 32. 
 42 See, e.g., Michael Cappucci, The ESG Integration Paradox, 30 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 22, 23–
26 (2018). 
 43 See, e.g., Gunnar Friede et al., ESG and Financial Performance: Aggregated Evidence from 
More than 2000 Empirical Studies, 5 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 210 (2015); Michael L. Barnett & 
Robert M. Salomon, Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Relationship Between Social Responsibility 
and Financial Performance, 27 STRATEGY MGMT. J. 1101 (2006) (collecting studies reaching 
contradictory conclusions and arguing that the divergence can be explained in part by the variation 
in methods used by different socially responsible investing techniques). 
 44 See Tim Verheyden et al., ESG for All? The Impact of ESG Screening on Return, Risk, and 
Diversification, 28 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 47, 50–51 (2016). 
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with poor ratings on these topics.”45 A metastudy of over two thousand 
studies of ESG investment performance concluded that “the business case 
for ESG investing is empirically well founded” and that “[i]nvesting in 
ESG pays financially.”46  
B. Passive ESG
The latest development in ESG investing is its combination with 
passive strategies tracking indices to offer investors both diversification 
and competitive pricing.47 Unlike active funds, in which fund managers 
seek to pick winning investments and avoid losing ones as they construct 
their portfolios, passive investments utilize an externally created index 
and map their portfolios to it as much as possible. For example, the 
iShares Core S&P 500 ETF seeks to match its portfolio to the S&P 500. 
Fund returns track those of the underlying index, and costs are reduced 
by eliminating much of the need for research and expertise in portfolio 
construction (the “active” part of active management).   
Passive investing is a huge trend. Fund houses launched over six 
hundred new index funds in 2017 and added $223 billion in net cash flows 
to index mutual funds.48 The trend continued in 2018 with $207 billion 
of new money in passive U.S. funds ($174 billion of which came out of 
active funds).49 Market experts predicted the passive market would 
exceed actively managed funds by 2024, but it happened in September 
 45 Mozaffar Khan et al., Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality, 91 ACCT. REV. 
1697, 1716 (2016). 
46 Friede et al., supra note 43, at 212. 
 47 See Jill E. Fisch et al., The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive 
Investors, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. 17, 30 (2019). Professors Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon 
describe passive strategies as exploding to “the point where there are now more indexes than 
publicly traded U.S. stocks.” Id. at 31. In addition to tracking indices, passive strategies may convert 
traditional active investment into a rules-based approach, or strategies that combine eighty percent 
passive with twenty percent active strategies. See id. The proliferation of passive and passive-like 
strategies dilutes the concept beyond the point of a singular definition or consensus. See id. 
48 See INV. CO. INST., 2018 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 75–76 (2018), 
https://www.ici.org/pdf/2018_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT5E-GW4F]. 
 49 Morningstar Reports U.S. Mutual Fund and ETF Asset Flows for Full-Year and December 
2018, MORNINGSTAR (Jan. 17, 2019), https://newsroom.morningstar.com/newsroom/news-
archive/press-release-details/2019/Morningstar-Reports-US-Mutual-Fund-and-ETF-Asset-
Flows-for-Full-Year-and-December-2018/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/DS8Y-VY4M]. 
1936 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1921 
2019.50 Recently, passive funds capture seventy percent of new money in 
markets.51 Passive ESG funds coming online track fledgling indices of 
leading ESG companies, offering investors a lower-cost and seemingly 
less risky alternative to active management while still pursuing ESG 
excellence. As noted above, they now compose nearly a third of the 
sustainable funds market.52 
Exchange-traded funds—ETFs—are a passive investment product 
permutation with shares, as the name suggests, traded on an exchange.53 
Trading fund shares on an exchange allows for price fluctuations and 
trading throughout the day, as compared to the end of day pricing and 
trade clearing with traditional mutual funds. Many, but not all, ETFs 
track an index.54 The Investment Company Institute (ICI) valued the 
2019 U.S. ETF market at $4.4 trillion in assets comprising sixteen percent 
of net investment company assets.55 The ETF market is highly 
 50  See, e.g., Trevor Hunnicutt, Index Funds to Surpass Active Fund Assets in U.S. by 2024: 
Moody’s, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2017, 9:31 AM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-
passive/index-funds-to-surpass-active-fund-assets-in-u-s-by-2024-moodys-idUSKBN15H1PN 
[https://perma.cc/L3B7-XBEV]; John Gittelsohn, End of Era: Passive Equity Funds Surpass Active 
in Epic Shift, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2019, 11:21 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2019-09-11/passive-u-s-equity-funds-eclipse-active-in-epic-industry-shift [https://perma.cc/
6FPU-8XA5]. 
 51 See MORNINGSTAR, U.S. FUND FEE STUDY (2018), https://www.morningstar.com/lp/annual-
us-fund-fee-study; see also INV. CO. INST., supra note 48, at 41. 
52 See MORNINGSTAR, supra note 3, at 8. 
 53 See SEC, INVESTOR BULLETIN: EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS (ETFS) 1 (2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/etfs.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJH3-L9L2]. Another key feature of 
ETFs is that the trading price of fund shares fluctuates throughout the day, as opposed to once-a-
day priced NAV for traditional mutual funds. See id. at 2. The trading price of an ETF share may 
be above or below the NAV for the underlying fund assets. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 48, at 85. 
 54 See INV. CO. INST., supra note 48, at 87–88. Index-based ETFs use several methods such as 
(1) index plus tracking of index through market capitalization, (2) benchmarking using additional 
factors like sales or book value, and (3) factor-based metrics that include screening indexes,
weighting, and further customization to achieve various investment strategies (diversification, low 
volatility, market alignment or variation, etc.). See id.
55 INV. CO. INST., 2020 Investment Company Fact Book 83 (2020), https://www.ici.org/pdf/
2020_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPG3-33S5] (valuing the ETF market at $4.4 trillion year end 
2019); INV. CO. INST., supra note 48, at 86 (stating a similar valuation for 2017); see also M. 
Szmigiera, Total Net Assets of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) in the United States from 2002 to 2018, 
STATISTA (May 10, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/295632/etf-us-net-assets 
[https://perma.cc/6G6M-KR3G]. 
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concentrated.56 In November 2018, iShares ETF funds experienced the 
highest monthly inflows out of the entire ETF market with $25.3 billion 
of new investment dollars.57 Two of iShares’ ESG-focused funds (iShares 
Core MSCI Emerging Markets and iShares Edge MSCI Minimum 
Volatility) contributed the strongest inflows.58 Other ETF providers are 
likewise generating new ESG ETF offerings.  
Specially crafted ESG indices are the backbone of passive ESG funds. 
For example, along with its negative screen, the Vanguard FTSE Social 
Index relies on an index developed by FTSE that “is market-capitalization 
weighted and includes primarily large- and mid-cap U.S. stocks that have 
been screened for certain criteria related to the environment, human 
rights, health and safety, labor standards, and diversity.”59 Indices created 
by MSCI are also quite popular. For example, the iShares MSCI USA ESG 
Select ETF tracks MSCI’s USA Extended ESG Select Index, “which is an 
optimized index designed to maximize exposure to favorable 
environmental, social and governance (‘ESG’) characteristics, while 
exhibiting risk and return characteristics similar to the MSCI USA 
Index.”60 Interestingly, ESG indices can also include negative screens of 
their own. For example, the MSCI Index used to compose the iShares 
MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF specifically excludes companies with 
“significant involvement” in “alcohol, tobacco, gambling, civilian 
firearms, nuclear power, controversial weapons, nuclear weapons, 
 56 See Socially Responsible ETF Overview, ETF.COM, https://www.etf.com/channels/socially-
responsible [https://perma.cc/72AG-C3NK] (reporting AUM in the ninety-seven socially 
responsible ETFs trading in U.S. markets and showing eleven of the largest twenty are offered by 
ishares, as well as a domintaing presence by Vanguard and Invesco). 
 57 See Morningstar Reports U.S. Mutual Fund and ETF Asset Flows for November 2018, 
MORNINGSTAR (Dec. 21, 2018), https://shareholders.morningstar.com/newsroom/news-archive/
press-release-details/2018/Morningstar-Reports-US-Mutual-Fund-and-ETF-Asset-Flows-for-
November-2018/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/GLN5-J933]. 
 58 See id. The iShares 1-3 Year Treasury Bond, a non-ESG fund, is the third named fund 
contributing to the strong monthly inflows. See id. For more current figures on fund flows, see 




59 Vanguard FTSE Soc. Index Fund, supra note 27. 
60 iShares MSCI USA ESG Select ETF, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Aug. 31, 2018). 
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conventional weapons, adult entertainment and genetically modified 
organisms.”61 
ESG indexed mutual funds and ETFs claim to combine two of the 
most powerful trends in investing: passive strategies and ESG. For 
investors looking for low-cost, guilt-free saving or wealth-building 
vehicles, they would seem the perfect solution. Further, with a reliable 
ESG index, fund houses can harness the return-enhancing value of ESG 
factors at manageable and marketable costs. But concerns about whether 
ESG investing can deliver on its tremendous promise, particularly in its 
low-regulation environment, persist in passive investing.   
Passive vehicles’ reliance on indexing also introduces unique issues 
regarding index creation and utilization. In an index fund, it becomes 
important to consider how closely the fund actually tracks its accepted 
index. As portfolios deviate from the index, certainty about the fund’s 
ESG performance—at least as measured by the index selected—
diminishes. This role for index providers can make them immensely 
powerful, but they are also intensely private.62 Inserting index providers 
into the ESG investment process increases its complexity and opacity for 
investors. These features of passive ESG funds make them a fascinating 
addition to the canvass as we unpack the challenges to realizing the goals 
of ESG investment. 
C. Our Study
The literature on ESG investing combined with the fast-paced, 
multifaceted growth of the practice suggests there will be great variation 
in ESG investment products available on the market. Rather than react to 
this mere likelihood of variation, we examined key attributes of thirty-
one top ESG funds on the market, along with a select group of non-ESG 
comparators in the same fund family. Our findings add specificity and 
substance to the arguments we address.  
61 iShares MSCI KLD 400 Soc. ETF, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Aug. 31, 2018). 
 62 Although metrics giant MSCI announced last year that it would make its ESG ratings publicly 
available, the methods by which these ratings are generated remains private. See Hazel Bradford, 
MSCI ESG Ratings Now Publicly Available, PENSIONS & INV. (Nov. 26, 2019, 2:22 PM), 
https://www.pionline.com/esg/msci-esg-ratings-now-publicly-available [https://perma.cc/JJ56-
JHWS]. 
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Our study contained three distinct groups: ESG Funds, ESG Passive 
Funds (index and ETF, collectively ESGP), and non-ESG Comparison 
Funds.63 To generate our list64 of the “top” ESG funds, we combined 2017 
AUM65 with 2017 annual returns66 and Morningstar sustainability 
ratings.67 This list captured three passive funds that we transferred to our 
ESGP Funds list, leaving seventeen in our ESG Funds sample. To generate 
the other eleven ESGP Funds, we used a Morningstar report of the top US 
Passive Sustainable Funds,68 which is also based on 2017 year-end data. 
For our non-ESG Comparison Funds, we researched the fund families in 
our ESG Funds and ESGP Funds samples to identify a similar asset-class 
mutual fund or ETF product without an ESG component. There are seven 
funds in our non-ESG Comparison Funds sample. Appendix I lists the 
funds we review in this Article.  
To investigate how ESG is being operationalized, our study observed 
and compared five key attributes of the funds in our samples. We 
reviewed the ESG and ESGP Funds’ investment strategy disclosures to 
identify how and how thoroughly these funds describe their ESG 
investment approaches. We compared fund fees across the ESG and 
ESGP Fund samples, and in comparison to industry standard fees,69 to 
determine how inclusion of ESG considerations impacts the cost of 
investing. Fund portfolio holdings and voting records on ESG 
shareholder proposals provided insights on distinctiveness. Do ESG and 
ESGP Funds invest in different portfolio companies than non-ESG 
funds? Are they more willing to oppose management in support of 
shareholder proposals geared toward enhancing portfolio company ESG 
63 See infra Appendix I. 
 64 There is not widespread consensus of the “top” ESG funds because it depends on preference 
for type of ESG impact, how to define ESG, and how to balance with financial returns. After 
exhausting our research skills in trying to unearth a pre-existing list, we opted to compile our own. 
65 See MORNINGSTAR, supra note 3. 
66 Id. 
67 Id.; see also Morningstar Sustainability Rating, MORNINGSTAR (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/745467/morningstar-sustainability-rating.html 
[https://perma.cc/58FW-8UFH] (explaining Morningstar’s sustainability ratings). 
68 See MORNINGSTAR, PASSIVE SUSTAINABLE FUNDS, supra note 35, at 16. 
 69 We use the market average here instead of a direct comparison to our non-ESG Comparison 
Funds primarily because of the small size (seven) of this sample. In addition, the inclusion of 
emerging market funds in the non-ESG Comparison sample would distort the fee comparison point 
we want to make here, which is that ESG-branded products impose additional fees. From this point, 
we hope to explore and prompt readers to consider when that fee is worth it. 
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performance? Finally, we considered the tracking errors posted by ESGP 
Funds. Tracking error reveals the difference between the composition of 
a passively managed mutual fund or ETF and the underlying index 
against which it is constructed. As ESGP Funds are constructed against 
indices of high-performing ESG companies, larger tracking errors 
indicate alternative (lesser? greater?) ESG performance, with other 
consequences.   
We collected our data primarily from fund disclosures available on 
EDGAR after filing with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), 
including the Form 497K Summary Prospectus, which discloses funds’ 
investment strategies and risks, Form N-CSR, which reports fund 
holdings, and Form N-PX, which reports fund votes. We also make use 
of fund websites and publicly available mutual fund data compiled by 
financial data websites such as Morningstar. Given our small sample size, 
our data points are illustrative and not conclusively descriptive of the 
entire ESG market. We provide our data with the intent to contextualize 
the conversation. Our results and analysis appear below. 
1. Investment Strategies
As a first cut, investors must determine whether an investment’s 
combination of ESG strategy, ESG performance, financial return, and 
cost is suitable for them. While this is a familiar task for all investors—to 
pick the asset best suited to your risk tolerance and financial needs—the 
burden of the task is increased under the ESG mantle. Typical research 
tools include the summary (or full) prospectus, fund website, third party 
financial sites like Morningstar, or materials provided through an 
employer-sponsored defined contribution plan. Traditional investors 
spend little time with these materials, but perhaps ESG investors are more 
motivated.   
Unfortunately, even the most motivated of investors will struggle to 
unpack what ESG means for a particular fund in a meaningful way. ESG 
funds’ investment strategy statements are a little longer than non-ESG 
funds (by approximately eighty words), especially with ESGP funds (over 
two hundred additional words on average) likely accounting for the 
additional ESG discussion. This promising finding reveals little in terms 
of substance, however. ESG investment strategy statements vary widely 
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from silence, to generic,70 to moderate71 and specific statements. For 
example, the JP Morgan Emerging Markets Equity A 2018 filing 
investment strategy statement contains no ESG-specific disclosure.72 In 
the 608-word investment description, zero are devoted to describing how 
it is an ESG fund. The Neuberger Berman Socially Responsible 
Investment fund provides an example of a specific disclosure, with over 
seventy percent of the entire disclosure devoted to ESG. It states: 
[T]he Portfolio Managers look for those [portfolio companies]
that show leadership in environmental, social and governance
considerations, including progressive workplace practices and
community relations. In addition, the Portfolio Managers
typically look at a company’s record in public health and the
nature of its products. The Portfolio Managers judge firms on
their corporate citizenship overall, considering their
accomplishments as well as their goals. While these judgments
are inevitably subjective, the Fund endeavors to avoid
companies that derive revenue from gambling or the production
of alcohol, tobacco, weapons, or nuclear power. The Fund also
does not invest in any company that derives its total revenue
primarily from non-consumer sales to the military. Please see
the Statement of Additional Information for a detailed
description of the Fund’s ESG criteria. Although the Fund
 70 See e.g., Vanguard FTSE Soc. Index Fund, supra note 27 (including in its disclosed 
investment strategy that “[t]he Index is market-capitalization weighted and includes primarily 
large- and mid-cap U.S. stocks that have been screened for certain criteria related to the 
environment, human rights, health and safety, labor standards, and diversity”). 
 71 See e.g., iShares MSCI KLD 400 Soc. ETF, supra note 61 (“[M]arket capitalization index 
designed to target U.S. companies that have positive environmental, social and governance (‘ESG’) 
characteristics. As of April 30, 2018, the Underlying Index consisted of 403 companies identified 
by MSCI Inc. (the ‘Index Provider’ or ‘MSCI’) . . . . MSCI analyzes each eligible company’s ESG 
performance using proprietary ratings covering ESG criteria. Companies that MSCI determines 
have significant involvement in the following businesses are not eligible for the Underlying Index: 
alcohol, tobacco, gambling, civilian firearms, nuclear power, controversial weapons, nuclear 
weapons, conventional weapons, adult entertainment and genetically modified organisms.”). 
72 JPMorgan Emerging Mkts. Equity Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Mar. 1, 2018). 
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invests primarily in domestic stocks, it may also invest in stocks 
of foreign companies . . . .73 
In the middle of the two extremes are generic and moderate 
statements of ESG commitment. The Parnassus Endeavor Investor 
disclosure exemplifies a generic statement, providing that “The Adviser 
also takes environmental, social and governance (‘ESG’) factors into 
account in making investment decisions.”74 TIAA-CREF Social Choice 
Equity Institutional offers an example of a moderate ESG disclosure 
describing specific attributes of the environmental (E), social (S), and 
governance (G) factors contributing to portfolio selection.75  
Examining the ESGP Funds sample, we find a similar range of 
silence to specific disclosure types. In the 2018 sample, one fund was 
silent, devoting zero words in its statement of investment strategy to 
describe its ESG specific investment approach, but that fund in 2019 
changed it to a generic discussion of ESG considerations. Praxis funds in 
the same family include identical disclosures of the fund family’s ESG 
strategy. Such boilerplate provides some ESG information but does little 
to distinguish the different ESG strategies offered between the Praxis 
funds for consumers looking to understand their range of ESG 
investment options. With other fund families, like iShares, we observe 
variation between the strategy disclosures of different passive ESG funds 
within the family. For example, the iShares MSCI ACWI Low Carbon 
Target ETF 497K disclosure defines two dimensions of carbon exposure 
(“carbon emissions and potential carbon emissions from fossil fuel 
reserves”), describes carbon scoring, identifies the underlying index 
(MSCI), and further explains the portfolio construction.76 The strategy 
disclosed for iShares MSCI USA ESG Select ETF is also specific, but 
specifically different, describing its use of “an optimized index designed 
to maximize exposure to favorable environmental, social and governance 
 73 Neuberger Berman Equity Funds, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Mar. 29, 2018) 
(containing 398 ESG words out of 562 total investment strategy words). 
 74 Parnassus Endeavor Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (May 1, 2018) (containing 
sixteen ESG words out of a 384-word investment strategy statement, therefore dedicating just 4.1% 
of the investment strategy disclosure to ESG). 
 75 TIAA-CREF Soc. Choice Equity Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Mar. 1, 2018) 
(containing only seventy-seven ESG words out of a 668-word disclosure). 
76 iShares MSCI ACWI Low Carbon Target ETF (Form 497K) (Nov. 29, 2018). 
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(‘ESG’) characteristics, while exhibiting risk and return characteristics 
similar to the MSCI USA Index” and further detailing the index’s 
methodology.77 Disclosures for both funds, across both years, caution 
that the underlying index includes large- or mid-capitalized firms with 
concentrations in the financial and technology sectors—statements that 
come to life in our holdings data.78 The Green Century MSCI 
International Index Fund’s filing, another specific ESG disclosure, 
likewise describes the underlying index composition utilized, as well as 
the fund’s environmental focus on carbon exposure through fossil fuels, 
and exclusionary screens applied to the portfolio.79   
ESG investment strategies and the disclosures describing those 
strategies to investors vary significantly between funds. What is the harm 
in an undefined and un-demarcated ESG scope? The vagueness and 
variation in ESG funds empower fund managers. ESG fund strategy 
statements can be broad and vague, committing to, for example, 
“invest[] . . . in forward-thinking companies with more sustainable 
business models”80 or “employ[] a sustainable rating system based on its 
own, as well as third-party, data to identify issuers believed to present low 
risks in ESG.”81  
Beyond identifying the three qualifying attributes—“E,” “S,” and 
“G”—when funds discuss ESG investing, they do so using different 
definitions, qualifications, and metrics. TIAA-CREF’s dedicated ESG 
fund describes ESG as follows:  
The Fund’s investments are subject to certain ESG criteria. The 
ESG criteria are implemented based on data provided by 
independent research vendor(s). All companies must meet or 
exceed minimum ESG performance standards to be eligible for 
77 iShares MSCI USA ESG Select ETF, supra note 60. 
 78 iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF, supra note 61 (“[M]arket capitalization index designed 
to target U.S. companies that have positive environmental, social and governance (‘ESG’) 
characteristics. As of April 30, 2018, the Underlying Index consisted of 403 companies identified 
by MSCI Inc. (the ‘Index Provider’ or ‘MSCI’) . . . . MSCI analyzes each eligible company’s ESG 
performance using proprietary ratings covering ESG criteria. Companies that MSCI determines 
have significant involvement in the following businesses are not eligible for the Underlying Index: 
alcohol, tobacco, gambling, civilian firearms, nuclear power, controversial weapons, nuclear 
weapons, conventional weapons, adult entertainment and genetically modified organisms.”). 
79 Green Century Funds, Statement of Additional Information (Form 497K) (May 15, 2017). 
80 Pax World Funds Series Tr. I, Registration Statement (Form 485A) (Feb. 1, 2018). 
81 Amana Income Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Sept. 28, 2018). 
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inclusion in the Fund. The evaluation process favors companies 
with leadership in ESG performance relative to their peers. 
Typically, environmental assessment categories include climate 
change, natural resource use, waste management and 
environmental opportunities. Social evaluation categories 
include human capital, product safety and social opportunities. 
Governance assessment categories include corporate 
governance, business ethics and government and public policy. 
How well companies adhere to international norms and 
principles and involvement in major ESG controversies 
(examples of which may relate to the environment, customers, 
human rights and community, labor rights and supply chain, 
and governance) are other considerations.  
The ESG evaluation process is conducted on an industry-
specific basis and involves the identification of key performance 
indicators, which are given more or less relative weight 
compared to the broader range of potential assessment 
categories. Concerns in one area do not automatically eliminate 
an issuer from being an eligible Fund investment. When ESG 
concerns exist, the evaluation process gives careful 
consideration to how companies address the risks and 
opportunities they face in the context of their sector or industry 
and relative to their peers. The Fund will not generally invest in 
companies significantly involved in certain business activities, 
including but not limited to the production of alcohol, tobacco, 
military weapons, firearms, nuclear power and gambling 
products and services.82 
Even this extensive discussion leaves many open questions to the 
fund manager and its delegates. How far superior to a company’s peers 
must its performance be to constitute “leadership”? It appears that no 
minimum level of E, S, or G performance is required; how does leadership 
in one arena compensate for poor performance in another? When, and 
on what basis, will the negative screen be ignored? Of course, part of the 
value of investing in a fund is relying on an expert’s wisdom and expertise. 
Adding ESG issues to this domain, however, broadens this reliance and 
 82 TIAA-CREF Social Choice Intl. Equity Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Mar. 1, 
2018). 
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increases fund managers’ power, not only over investment and 
engagement decisions made on this basis, but also potentially over the 
attention and priority given to ESG issues (and ESG issues each 
independently) by portfolio companies. As these players motivated by 
financial return create demand for ESG metrics (or produce them in-
house), these metrics will also be developed to identify return-protecting 
and palatable companies, but not necessarily transformative change.   
Even when funds share a passive ESG strategy, a seeming niche of 
the market with considerable overlap, substantial variation persists. 
Because an ESG label does not represent a clear investment strategy, even 
when associated with passive funds, it primarily serves a branding 
function for the investing public. The market signal that a fund is “ESG” 
seems to be more about the normative “good” an investment can provide 
rather than signal how the investment works or the degree to which a 
fund even pursues ESG. A useful analogy may be to a fictional fund calling 
itself a “success” fund (something funds are not allowed to do). Investors 
may be drawn to the label and idea of success without having a clear 
understanding of why the fund may or may not achieve investment 
success. Market signals of this sort increase the burden on the investing 
public to decode the labels and differentiate the investment products 
offered.  
In short, the ESG investment market now designs products with a 
range of investment strategies, varying levels of commitment to ESG, and 
fluid definitional boundaries around what counts as ESG. Important 
questions about how a fund operationalizes ESG remain after this review. 
The opacity of the ESG investment market imposes a significant burden 
on investors to distinguish between ESG investments and match their 
preferences to the appropriate ESG strategy and outcome (for them) 
within the range of options. With opacity comes unchallenged leeway for 
managers and index providers, all shielded from public review.  
2. Fees
Cost is a key consideration in both choosing and designing 
investment products. Investors select products with fees they are willing 
to pay, and fund creators design products with fees that will make them 
competitive, yet profitable. Lower fees have been a tremendous force in 
the investment market, driving the rise of passive investing. Applying an 
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ESG lens necessarily introduces additional costs into portfolio 
construction. In active funds, managers must research and evaluate the 
ESG performance of potential portfolio companies and continue to assess 
them over time. In passive ESG funds, managers must purchase access to 
an index from an outside firm or dedicate resources to developing an 
index or rules-based model of their own. The cost of these extra burdens 
is likely passed along to ESG investors in the form of higher fees.   
Our sample shows a range of fees associated with ESG investment 
products.83 The average expense ratio is 1.09, but with a widely divergent 
range of fees from 0.18 (TIAA-Cref Social Choice Equity fund) to 1.47 
(Domini Impact International fund). The range of fees for passive ESG 
funds also varied considerably with a low of 0.19 in the Calvert US Large 
Cap Core Responsible Index and the highs around 1.30 for funds targeted 
on international markets (Praxis International Index at 1.32) or specific 
sectors (Calvert Global Water at 1.28). The greatly reduced cost of 
executing passive strategies compared to active strategies, which require 
individual portfolio asset oversight and monitoring, account for the 
different fees.84 Consider average mutual fund fees of 0.51–0.59 for all 
mutual funds compared to 0.09 for index equity funds.85 Our ESGP 
Funds average lower fees (0.68) than the active ESG Funds sample (1.09 
fees), but not this low. Table 2 below reports fees in our review of ESG 
and ESGP Funds. 
83 Data supporting this paragraph is listed in Table 2. 
 84 See, e.g., Dana Anspach, How Mutual Fund Expense Ratios Work, BALANCE (Dec. 3, 2019), 
https://www.thebalance.com/expense-ratios-paying-much-2388663 [https://perma.cc/7FLL-
ME35]. 
85 See INV. CO. INST., supra note 48, at 118, 123. A Morningstar report on 2017 fees based on a 
sample of 25,000 funds found the average expense ratio to be .52%. See MORNINGSTAR, supra note 
51, at 1. Investor fund flows into lower-fee fund options, like indexes, drive average fees down. See 
id. at 7–8. 
2020] BUYER BEWARE 1947 
Table 2: 2018 ESG Fees86 
In addition to revealing considerable variation across all ESG funds, 
we find ESGP Funds charge lower fees than those using active strategies, 
but higher fees than average non-ESG index products. Recent 
Morningstar research found similar results, reporting that while 
sustainable funds are competitive on fees, sustainable ETFs fees tended to 
be higher than average.87 These findings undermine the low-fee value 
 86 This table reflects 2018 fees only. We reviewed 2019 fees and found consistent results that 
the ESG funds are higher, on average, than non-ESG funds and that ESGP funds, while lower than 
ESG active funds, are still higher than non-ESG traditional passive funds. 
 87 See MORNINGSTAR, supra note 3, at 27; see also MORNINGSTAR, PASSIVE SUSTAINABLE 
FUNDS, supra note 35, at 1, 13, 18 (reporting findings that sustainable index funds in the United 
States and Europe are more expensive than standard index products). Note that the fees reported 
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proposition of passive strategies, but are easy to understand. Higher fees 
in passive ESG investing are likely reflect the new and different metrics 
on which ESG index products rely compared to traditional passive funds. 
To obtain market-worthy metrics, mutual fund families integrating 
ESG factors must invest in new personnel and expertise to create the 
metrics in-house or secure metrics or index information from external 
providers for a (presumably hefty)88 price. MSCI, which supplies indices 
for more of the ESG index funds in our sample than any other provider, 
offers a “suite of over 1,000 equity and fixed income ESG 
Indexes . . . designed to represent [the performance of] some of the most 
prevalent ESG strategies.”89 MSCI claims to “help institutional investors 
more effectively benchmark to ESG investment performance well as 
manage, measure and report on ESG mandates.”90 The Vanguard FTSE 
Social Index Fund, the largest passive ESG fund with quadruple the assets 
under management (four billion dollars) of any other fund in our sample, 
in our paper are a small, nonrepresentative sample of the ESG market and thus may be skewed 
higher as a result of the sample, inclusion of legacy sustainable funds, and different share class fees 
being reported (although we took institutional share class numbers whenever available). 
 88 A 2017 report by Investment Week cites index fees ranging from £22,000–150,000 for the 
licensing fees and use of data. See Tom Eckett & Anna Fedorova, Managers Reconsider Use of Index 
Providers amid ‘Eye-Watering’ Costs, INV. WEEK (June 8, 2017), 
https://www.investmentweek.co.uk/investment-week/news/3011594/managers-reconsider-use-
of-index-providers-amid-eye-watering-costs [https://perma.cc/9NZ9-YXL6]. Given the 
proprietary nature of the ESG indices there is little concern, at least now, of stealth indexing where 
active ESG funds mimic market-indexed funds and still charge a higher fee. See K.J. Martijn 
Cremers & Quinn Curtis, Do Mutual Fund Investors Get What They Pay For? Securities Law and 
Closet Index Funds, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 31 (2016) (describing the costs and legal consequences of 
closet indexing). 
 89 ESG Investing, MSCI, https://www.msci.com/esg-integration [https://perma.cc/6Z2F-
UVJM]; see also MSCI, MSCI ESG MULTI-ASSET CLASS ANALYTICS 4 (2018), 
https://www.msci.com/documents/1296102/11039838/MSCI+ESG+Analytics+Brochure.pdf/
e54eb02f-1c09-f394-3768-ec7a776f9973 [https://perma.cc/7QHK-X34D] (claiming MSCI is “the 
world’s largest provider of ESG research and data”). 
 90 MSCI ESG Indexes, MSCI, https://www.msci.com/esg-indexes [https://perma.cc/HNT9-
KTQK]; MSCI, MSCI ESG SCREENED INDEXES: AN OFF-THE-SHELF APPROACH TO ESG SCREENS 3 
(2019), https://www.msci.com/documents/1296102/1636401/MSCI-ESG-Screened-Indexes-
Brochure.pdf/ff64b0bc-f06e-298b-f84b-95814f193ed4 [https://perma.cc/DC47-DD7Z] (boasting 
that over $250 billion in institutional, retail, and ETF assets are benchmarked to MSCI ESG 
Indexes). For a discussion of the concentration of the index industry and its resulting power, see 
Johannes Petry et al., Steering Capital: The Growing Private Authority of Index Providers in the Age 
of Passive Asset Management, REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 1 (2019), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
full/10.1080/09692290.2019.1699147 [https://perma.cc/B788-W9AZ]. 
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relies on the FTSE4Good US Select Index, a market-capitalization 
weighted U.S. equity index that, as noted above, excludes “tobacco, 
alcohol, adult entertainment, firearms, gambling, [and] nuclear power” 
stocks.91 The index is produced by FTSE Russell, a leading global provider 
of indices that developed its first FTSE4Good Index products in 2001 and 
now offers numerous suites of ESG indices, across various strategies and 
asset classes.92 As does MSCI, FTSE Russell also offers ESG benchmarking 
and metrics products in addition to these proprietary indices.   
At least with regard to some ESG products, fees diverge from market 
norms. This imposes a burden on investors to investigate fees and decide 
whether the blend of potential financial and non-financial returns from 
ESG investments—which is itself difficult to discern and assess—is 
sufficient to compensate them for higher costs. Further, as we document 
more below, there may be tension between low fees and high ESG impact. 
As large complexes, like iShares, continue to gain market share, there will 
be increasing ESG fee pressure—a financial positive that may lessen ESG 
impact.93 
3. Portfolio Holdings
Here we examine the portfolio companies in which ESG funds 
invest. The range of portfolio company holdings is consistent with the 
range of investment styles (United States vs. international; specific 
industry/sector vs. whole market, etc.) and the range of ESG commitment 
reflected in investment strategies. That disclaimer aside, the holdings 
reported in Appendix II may surprise even skeptics.  
91 Vanguard FTSE Soc. Index Fund, supra note 27. 
 92 See FTSE RUSSELL, FTSE4GOOD INDEX SERIES 1 (2019), https://www.ftse.com/products/
downloads/FTSE4Good-brochure.pdf?_ga=2.193271214.2070678876.1550678839-407133334.
1550678839 [https://perma.cc/4BV8-MVX5] (describing origination and development of 
FTSE4Good Index); FTSE ESG Index Series, FTSE RUSSEL, https://www.ftse.com/products/indices/
esg [https://perma.cc/5ZEV-CFJ2] (linking to information on the various ESG index series 
available from the firm). 
93 Gabriel Presler, Sustainable Funds U.S. Landscape: 5 Takeaways from Our 2018 Report, 
MORNINGSTAR (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.morningstar.com/blog/2019/02/19/esg-
landscape.html [https://perma.cc/X4ME-L66C] (“Behemoths like BlackRock and Vanguard bring 
increasing fee pressure into an area that has historically been associated with higher costs.”). 
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To explore portfolio holdings, we review the top holdings, as 
measured by percent of fund assets invested in a company.94 For 
consistency and manageability, we capped all reported holdings at the top 
ten portfolio companies. While this is a small subset of holdings for a 
relatively small sample of funds, the information is still too diffuse and 
granular to get a sense of what companies are included in ESG funds. To 
focus our discussion, we researched each portfolio company and assigned 
it one of the following broad categories:  
• Financial services: capital providers to individuals and
businesses, insurance companies, credit card companies,
and large financial institutions, such as Intercontinental
Exchange, Inc.
• Technology and tech infrastructure companies: companies
that make integrated technology software, hardware, or
products including companies, such as Apple, Alphabet
(Google’s investment arm), Microsoft, Vodafone, AT&T,
etc.
• Consumer products and services: companies making goods
or providing goods (including retail) for individual
consumption and use, such as Clorox, Hanes, Dollar
General, Starbucks, Amazon, Alibaba, PepsiCo Inc., Wal-
Mart, etc.
• Pharmaceuticals and health: companies manufacturing over
the counter and prescription medicine for humans and
animals, medical device companies, and pharmacies, such as
Eli Lilly, Pfizer Inc., United Health Group, Inc., and CVS
Health Corp.
• Other: companies focused on business operations, logistics,
small component parts, the automobile, railroad, and energy
industries, etc.
There are some companies for which the category assignment is 
reasonably debatable, such as 3M Co., which is assigned as a consumer 
product despite its wide range of operations. The category assignment 
reflects our predilection for post-it notes rather than a balance sheet or 
 94 We report the top ten holdings of each fund in our sample, as reported in the fall of 2018. 
Holdings are listed in Appendix II, infra. Raw data is on file with authors. 
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operations analysis. Categorical assignments are intended to condense 
disparate information into a digestible, although imperfect, snapshot of 
the portfolio holdings for purposes of illustration, not causal analysis. The 
categories also reflect, in part, our interest in household names, which 
appeared repeatedly across both the four industry categories and the 
“other” category, in which clear examples of household name companies 
such as Walt Disney and Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. were common. 
The following three charts report the distribution of the top ten 
portfolio company holdings in our broad categories across our three 
samples of funds in 2018–2019. This albeit rough view of portfolio 
holdings gives us a sense of what markets/sectors these funds invest in, 
allowing for rough comparisons of ESG fund portfolio construction to 
non-ESG funds. Although our ESG Funds and ESGP Funds samples 
reflect a wide range of ESG “commitments” and investment styles 
(international, domestic, growth, large cap, etc.), assigning each portfolio 
company to one of our broad categories yields industry distributions. 
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ESG funds hold more finance companies—its top weighted 
industry—than ESGP. Both ESG and ESGP heavily invest in the 
technology and infrastructure sectors. Both have similar exposures to 
consumer facing companies and pharmaceuticals or health care 
companies.   
The “other” category—captures the largest share of top ten portfolio 
holdings in both ESGP Funds and non-ESG Comparison Funds sample. 
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As a catchall by design, it is important to unpack the range of firms 
included in this category to understand our findings. In reviewing the 
constituent firms assigned to the “other” category across our samples, one 
observation stands out. For non-ESG funds, the “other” category includes 
a concentration of traditional energy industry players and automobile 
manufacturers in the top ten holdings. In contrast, both company types 
are conspicuously absent from the top ten portfolio holdings (but not all 
holdings) of the ESG and ESGP Funds we studied.95 If nothing else, ESG 
investments on the aggregate appear to provide differential exposure, at 
least in terms of depth, to the traditional energy and automobile sectors 
than their non-ESG competitors. Otherwise, the composition of the non-
ESG Comparison funds looks similar to ESGP funds, with a greater 
emphasis on pharmaceuticals and health care.  
The other differences across the samples are less dramatic, but still 
worthy of discussion. Some are likely driven largely by the group of ESG 
funds that concentrate on a particular ESG theme or sector. For example, 
in the ESGP Funds sample, the “other” category is largely comprised 
(sixty-one percent) of portfolio companies held by sector/thematic ESG 
funds focused on water, clean energy, etc.,96 and not held by non-ESG 
Comparison funds. When looking at 2018 data alone, we also saw 
differentiation on consumer services and products (more prevalent in 
non-ESG Comparison funds), but those differences mostly fall away 
when adding in 2019 data. Our sample included no funds built around an 
explicit consumer products/services theme, but it is possible that 
consumer-facing firms face especially significant pressure to engage in 
corporate social responsibility efforts, allowing overrepresentation 
among ESG fund portfolios.97 ESG commitments can be a part of a brand 
identity and marketing strategy just as quality or price can be.   
 95 For example, in 2019 iShares MSCI ACWI Low Carbon Target ETF held positions in oil 
companies, automobile manufacturers, and tobacco companies in addition to the standard 
financial and technology companies. See also Akane Otani, ESG Funds Enjoy Record Inflows, Still 
Back Big Oil and Gas, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2019, 4:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/top-esg-
funds-are-all-still-invested-in-oil-and-gas-companies-11573468200?mod=searchresults&page=
1&pos=1 [https://perma.cc/V9PQ-43ND]. 
 96 There are no observable patterns driving the composition of the “other” category in our ESG 
Funds sample, although it also includes thematic funds. 
 97 See N. Craig Smith, Consumers as Drivers of Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 281, 297–98 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008) 
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Our review of portfolio holdings across all three samples also 
revealed a strikingly consistent reliance on household name brand 
companies.98 All samples have at least a handful of funds where all top ten 
holdings are household name brands. For example, in 2018, TIAA-CREF 
Social Choice Equity fund was entirely comprised of household name 
brands. As expected, the number is clearly higher in the non-ESG 
Comparison funds. The percentages of portfolio holdings with mixed or 
higher household name brand exposures is similar across the three 
samples with the highest in the non-ESG Comparison (eighty-six 
percent) and lowest in ESGP (sixty-five percent) and ESG in the middle 
(seventy-five percent).  
(arguing that consumers are likely less important drivers of CSR among business-to-business 
firms). 
 98 We defined household name brand in light of our subjective evaluation of a company’s 
status. As noted above, we researched each portfolio company, and in that way possibly skewed our 
perception.  
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 Table 3 provides readers with some instructive examples drawn 
from our household name brand analysis. It reports the household name 
companies in each category described above (aside from “other”) 
appearing among the top ten holdings of funds in our ESGP Funds 
sample. Numbers indicate totals; sample firms are listed in the second 
row, noting companies held by multiple funds. Household name brand 
holdings were consistent in 2018 and 2019. For readers seeking still 
greater detail, Appendix II lists the top ten portfolio company holdings 
(2018) for our entire sample: ESG Funds, ESGP Funds, and non-ESG 
Comparison Funds.  
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Table 3: Review of Top 10 2018 & 2019 “Household Name” 
Holdings of ESGP Funds Sample 
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We make no normative judgment about the inclusion of household 
name brands in a fund as a good indicator of ESG commitment or not, 
nor of the underlying merits of these portfolio companies’ performance 
on E, S, or G metrics.100 Our observation instead is that, outside of 
thematic ESG funds such as those focusing on clean energy or water,101 
there is little to distinguish between ESG branded funds and non-ESG 
branded funds with regard to recognizable ESG quality of their top 
portfolio companies. A simple specialist/generalist dichotomy may help 
explain the varied focus on name brand portfolio companies. Of the funds 
 99  Many funds, such as iShares MSCI ACWI Low Carbon Target ETF held two different classes 
of Alphabet stock (class A and C) among its top ten holdings, which were counted twice. Infra 
Appendix II.  
 100  Given the breadth of ESG implementation approaches, including integration of ESG risks 
and opportunities in decision making, the portfolios of ESG and non-ESG funds unsurprisingly 
overlap, especially as ESG integration is viewed as a tool of risk mitigation and return protection. 
See e.g., MORNINGSTAR, BETTER MINUS WORSE: EVALUATING ESG EFFECTS ON RISK AND RETURN 
(2020), https://www.morningstar.com/lp/esg-as-a-factor [https://perma.cc/Y6DH-DT6C] 
(reporting on the effects of ESG holdings in portfolio risk exposure and returns). 
 101 Passive ESG funds with a thematic focus, such as Calvert Global Water and Guggenheim 
Solar ETF funds, are comprised exclusively of companies outside of the mainstream. As noted 
earlier, all of these funds’ portfolio companies also fall into the “other” category, reflecting the 
overlap between the industry categories and the name brand distinction. Infra Appendix II.  
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that have mixed or low recognition, they are primarily sector-based ESG 
funds and international or emerging market-focused funds. The same is 
true of non-ESG fund holdings.  
In this Section and as further documented in Appendix II, we 
observe mainstream investments and overlapping investments in 
particular portfolio companies such as Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Bank 
of America, Facebook, and Microsoft, by funds in all three sample groups. 
These observations alone are not damning as to ESG commitment; we 
make no claim as to the ESG performance of the portfolio companies. We 
note the prevalence of mainstream investments in light of the range of 
disclosed ESG criteria and investment strategies. An investor looking to 
invest in a “good” ESG fund will struggle to distinguish between products 
based on the disclosures and on the top holdings when the ESG criteria 
are hard to discern and the holdings concentrated in mainstream 
companies.   
Investors are responsible for understanding both the risk and the 
opportunity of any investment. Our observations raise questions about 
ESG market efficiency, however, when the information required to 
distinguish and assess various investment products is diffuse, 
disaggregated, and hard to interpret. Information asymmetry of this kind 
impedes ESG labels from carrying substantive information to investors, 
relegating its value again to branding and market signaling rather than 
investor education. 
4. Voting
Voting patterns are another way to unpack the range of ESG options 
from which investors can choose. Voting is particularly important in 
passive funds for which purchases and sales are constrained by the need 
to track an underlying index. While shareholder engagement comprises 
informal attempts to influence portfolio company management, 
advancing shareholder proposals, and voting on both shareholder 
proposals and other matters raised by management, not all of these are 
transparent and frequently relevant to ESG investing. We therefore focus 
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on votes on shareholder proposals, many of which address ESG issues,102 
and for which fund voting records are publicly disclosed. 
Despite the availability of mutual fund and ETF votes, developing a 
sense of funds’ voting activity is daunting. Funds file voting disclosures 
in text form, using various formats, and often running hundreds of pages. 
Searching is made more difficult by the common practice of including 
votes by multiple, similarly named funds in the same document. We 
amassed just two years (2018 and 2019) of data on our thirty-one funds,103 
and it required searching thousands of lines of disclosures by hand. 
Occasionally, this task was further complicated by vague descriptions of 
proposals on which funds vote. In the most striking example we 
encountered, the Amana Growth Fund 2019 disclosure lists merely 
“[c]onsider and vote upon one stockholder proposal” at Adobe annual 
meeting, reporting its vote against the proposal.104 Only through review 
of another fund’s description of votes at the same Adobe meeting were 
we able to discern the proposal in question concerned a report on the 
gender pay gap. The data we report below emerge from this arduous, but 
imperfect, process and should be understood as such.   
Our review of the 2018 and 2019 voting records disclosed by funds 
in each of our three sample groups on ESG-related shareholder proposals 
generated results broadly aligned with our sense that investors get the 
ESG they are willing to pay for. Funds offered by large, generalist fund 
complexes were the only ones to consistently clash with ESG 
expectations. Vanguard’s FTSE Social Index fund posted perhaps the 
 102 See, e.g., ROBERT KALB ET AL., ISS ANALYTICS, A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE 2018 US 
PROXY SEASON 4–6 (2018), https://www.isscorporatesolutions.com/file/documents/ics_a_
preliminary_review_of_the_2018_us_proxy_season.pdf?elqTrackId=8bd378d423324ecdb189
187cc8f09cb1&elq=e1fa6417035a49dea20d5c16f66c81d5&elqaid=969&elqat=1&elqCampaignId= 
[https://perma.cc/6VB8-URNG] (reviewing the 2018 proxy season, including ESG proposals as 
major components). 
 103 The voting records are taken from Forms N-PX filed with the SEC in 2018 and 2019, 
reporting funds’ votes cast during the 2018 and 2019 proxy seasons. We focused on votes in the top 
holdings assuming that funds may not have resources to devote to monitoring all proxy issues at all 
companies in which the fund invests, but also assuming that scarce proxy resources would be 
devoted to monitoring votes at companies topping funds’ holdings lists. In addition to examining 
all votes at top portfolio companies, we analyzed every vote reported by each fund on three 
indicative categories of ESG issues as noted in Table 4, infra. 
 104 Amana Mut. Funds Tr., Annual Report of Proxy Voting Record of Registered Management 
Investment Company (Form N-PX) (June 30, 2019). 
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most surprising voting history, opposing every shareholder proposal 
recommending climate change reporting and against dozens of proposals 
on gender pay equity, employee diversity reports and policies, and 
political spending disclosure.105 The Hartford Schroders Emerging 
Market Equity Fund was also quite negative on the ESG issues it 
confronted. In 2018, it voted against two proposals on climate change, 
posted a mix of yes, no, and abstention votes on various diversity and 
gender pay equity proposals, and voted against five proposals to report 
on political spending. The three iShares ETFs in our sample, managed by 
passive investing giant BlackRock, seemed to shift their voting 
perspectives over the two years in our sample. While they had supported 
many shareholder proposals on climate change, gender pay/diversity, and 
political spending the prior year, the iShares ETFs in our ESGP sample 
voted against nearly all ESG proposals they faced in 2019. 
In contrast, funds offered by specialized ESG fund creators voted 
fairly consistently in favor of shareholder proposals geared toward 
enhancing portfolio company ESG performance. For example, the Mid-
Cap fund offered by Parnassus Investments, a firm that declares itself the 
“[l]argest pure play ESG fund company”106 supported a proposal to 
include sustainability as a performance measure for senior executive 
compensation at Alphabet/Google. It likewise opposed management on 
ESG issues across both years and various holdings, voting in favor of 
proposals on gender pay equity, adoption of a board diversity policy, 
human rights, reporting on political spending, forced labor in the supply 
chain, and greenhouse gas emissions. The PAX MSCI EAFE ESG Leaders 
Index Fund, a passive product offered by ESG-specialist Pax World 
 105 For analogous findings of mismatch across the Big Three’s voting records on stock buybacks 
and M&A, despite the claimed long-term orientation of these fund families, see Jan Fichtner & 
Eelke M. Heemskerk, The New Permanent Universal Owners: Index Funds, (Im)patient Capital, and 
the Claim of Long-Termism 17–30 (CorpNet, Working Paper, 2018), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3321597 [https://perma.cc/6J3X-NVRQ]; see also Ross Kerber & Tim McLaughlin, Biggest 
U.S. Index Funds Oppose Most Climate Proposals in Shareholder Votes, REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2019, 6:05 
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-funds-index-climatechange/biggest-u-s-index-
funds-oppose-most-climate-proposals-in-shareholder-votes-idUSKBN1WN105 
[https://perma.cc/ZM3L-UMQ2] (reporting widespread voting against climate change proposals 
by large U.S. index funds). 
 106 Who We Are, PARNASSUS INV., https://www.parnassus.com/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/
2MHQ-LYX3]. 
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Funds,107 also consistently voted in favor of climate change and 
gender/diversity-focused proposals, as well as proposals to curb 
corporate political donations. It even opposed management proposals 
seeking European Union (EU)-required approval of political donations 
and expenditures many times over. Such proposals were extremely 
common in the two years we studied, and PAX funds posted among the 
very few votes ever to oppose them.  
A simple specialist/generalist dichotomy alone does not explain all 
the variation we observe, however. Longstanding sustainable investing 
specialist Calvert108 posted a mixed record. Calvert opposed management 
and voted in favor of several proposals for reports on gender pay and 
diversity across its holdings. Its Equity A fund supported greenhouse gas 
emission reporting and its US Large Cap Core Responsible Index Fund 
supported both the Alphabet/Google proposal to include sustainability as 
a performance measure in executive compensation and a proposal to 
establish a human rights board committee at Apple. But the Calvert US 
Large Cap Core Responsible Fund also voted against four climate change 
proposals.   
At times, even the more consistent niche players split votes on ESG 
proposals addressing related topics. For example, Neuberger Berman’s109 
Socially Responsible Fund voted in favor of all but one of a 2018 series of 
environmental proposals at Kroger. It supported proposals on renewable 
energy and deforestation and the supply chain but voted against a 
proposal to report on environmental impacts of the company’s continued 
use of non-recyclable packaging.110 In 2019, the Endeavor Fund offered 
by specialist Parnassus split its votes on diversity issues; it supported 
 107 See About Pax, PAX WORLD FUNDS, https://paxworld.com/about [https://perma.cc/K8UG-
4BPL] (“[W]e offer a diverse lineup of investment strategies focused on the investment risks and 
opportunities associated with the transition to a more sustainable global economy.”). 
 108 See CALVERT, https://www.calvert.com [https://perma.cc/5Q4B-M6M6] (“Calvert has been 
at the forefront of ESG investing for decades . . . .”). 
 109 The Neuberger Berman states that “[a]cross our investment platform, Neuberger Berman 
looks for opportunities to engage on ESG issues and trends, and to support clients to increase the 
impact of their investments.” Who We Are, NEUBERGER BERMAN, https://www.nb.com/en/global/
who-we-are [https://perma.cc/XV86-MCT9]. 
 110  Neuberger Berman Nationwide Variable Insurance Trust, Annual Report of Proxy Voting 
Record of Nationwide Variable Insurance Trust (Form N-PX) (Aug. 20, 2018). The Fund also 
supported an ESG reporting proposal, multiple lobbying reporting proposals, and gender pay gap 
risk reporting. See id. 
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several gender pay gap proposals but opposed two concerning board 
diversity. 
Table 4 reports 2019 votes by funds in our three samples on three 
types of shareholder proposals that raise ESG issues.111 Note that it 
tabulates fund votes only on climate change and sustainability 
(environmental), gender pay and diversity (social), and political spending 
(governance)112 proposals.113 Of course, the sample funds confronted and 
voted on many other types of ESG proposals beyond the types Table 4 
reports. Many faced votes on lobbying reporting, human rights issues, 
data privacy, changes to voting procedures, and independent board chair 
requirements. Representing the full range of proposals in a 
comprehensible format proved difficult, so we confine Table 4 to these 
three types of issues to provide an accessible snapshot of our results. 
Various other votes are highlighted in the discussion above and the 
analysis of potential explanations for the results that follows Table 4.  
 111 Some of these votes may have been registered on proposals ultimately withdrawn by their 
proponents after negotiation with management to address the underlying issues. Regardless, they 
remain useful indicators of funds’ ESG commitments. 
 112 Views vary on whether other governance issues like independent board chair mandates or 
voting rule changes will impact financial performance. As our goal was to track a “G” issue that 
would align with investor perspectives on what is normatively good governance regardless of any 
related bottom line effect, we chose political spending. Proposals seeking disclosure of political 
spending seek greater transparency in pursuit of good governance, rather than performance 
changes in the targeted firm. 
 113 A similar table reporting the 2018 votes appears in Appendix III, infra. As noted there, when 
compiling the 2018 voting records, we searched only for proposals addressing climate change 
specifically. We were disappointed this search yielded relatively little information. To draw in a 
more representative “E” sample, for the 2019 data reported in Table 4, infra, we also include 
proposals more broadly addressing issues of sustainability. 
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 114 Many of the funds in our sample voted on management proposals to authorize political 
spending, per European regulations. As these were not shareholder proposals, we do not report 
votes on them in Table 4. Other than the PAX opposition to these proposals, noted supra text 
accompanying note 107, these proposals were widely supported across all three fund categories. 
 115 Split votes are reported in the format for-against unless the fund abstained, in which case 
votes are reported in the format for-against-abstention. 
 116 Several funds in our sample faced no relevant votes on our selected environmental, social 
and governance issues during our sample period. Indeed, some faced no ESG-related proposals at 
all. Funds without reportable votes were primarily those dedicated to emerging market companies. 
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There are numerous explanations for why ESG funds in our sample 
do not uniformly support shareholder proposals aimed to enhance 
portfolio company ESG performance. Importantly, not every fund in our 
sample adopts an ESG orientation per se. For example, we included the 
Amana funds in our sample based on their AUM, returns, and 
Morningstar sustainability ratings, but Amana’s philosophy is more aptly 
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described as values-aligned and faith-based. It explains that “[t]he Amana 
Funds limit the securities they purchase to those consistent with Islamic 
principles.”118 The voting record of Praxis Growth Index Fund, whose 
sponsor “embrace[s] a wide range of social concerns our Christian faith 
calls us to consider—as well as traditional, prudent, financial 
considerations,”119 too, is mixed on proposals raising ESG issues. These 
faith-based models need not overlap with environmental sustainability 
concerns and may offer a different vision of social issues to investors, with 
which their voting records may well align.  
Even for funds with a secular ESG goal, these issues still entail 
challenging and contested questions about what course of action will 
achieve ESG gains. For example, many funds in our samples voted on 
proposals to adopt or pursue reporting on compliance with the Holy 
Land Principles in 2018. Depending on one’s views about the Holy Land 
Principles, a yes-vote might be seen to further social considerations 
favoring anti-discrimination efforts or to undermine social 
considerations by inflaming sectarian conflict. In addition, ESG gains can 
be in conflict with each other and will not always correlate with financial 
return. Fund management dedicated to integrating ESG factors into their 
investment strategies might reasonably dispute the value of individual 
proposals that on their face appear geared toward enhancing ESG 
performance.   
Even if the underlying issue a proposal raises is clearly one intended 
to further ESG performance, not all such shareholder proposals will 
advocate good ideas and our sample does not attempt to discern the 
quality of shareholder proposals. SEC rules impose numerous limitations 
on who can make shareholder proposals and their content,120 and issuers 
can seek guidance from the SEC staff on whether submitted proposals can 
118 SATURNA CAP., https://www.saturna.com/amana [https://perma.cc/CEX6-CY4C]. 
 119 PRAXIS MUTUAL FUNDS, https://www.praxismutualfunds.com [https://perma.cc/9CAM-
JU7E]. 
120 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8 (2019) (limiting proposal access to shareholders holding “at least 
$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company’s securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at 
the meeting for at least one year” and limiting each such shareholder to one proposal per meeting 
and the length of the proposal to under five hundred words). 
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be (relatively) safely excluded from management’s proxy materials.121 
This process will often weed out proposals that raise improper issues or 
sow confusion, but a proposal appropriately included on management’s 
proxy can still address an ESG issue in a way that a particular ESG fund 
considers unnecessary, counterproductive, or unwise.   
Consider the Kroger proposal on non-recyclable packaging that was 
opposed by Neuberger Berman’s Socially Responsible Fund. The 
company faced prior shareholder proposals on this same issue and had 
issued a plan in 2016 to address environmental issues in its packaging by 
2020.122 A fund with strong commitments to ESG might view the 
company’s efforts as sufficient and the proposed reporting obligation to 
be a potential distraction. Indeed, although the shareholder proposal 
failed, Kroger announced shortly thereafter that it planned to phase out 
plastic bags entirely by 2025.123 
Another good example is the conflicting votes cast by the Morgan 
Stanley Global Opportunity Portfolio Fund on two proposals addressing 
government use of facial recognition technology at Amazon in 2019. The 
Fund voted against a shareholder proposal to prohibit sales of facial 
recognition technology to government agencies but abstained on a 
proposal requesting a report on the impact of government use of such 
technologies. (Management opposed both measures.) Like several others, 
this fund also consistently voted yes on proposals on the gender pay gap 
but often voted against board diversity proposals. A reasonable ESG-
committed investor may well view government use of facial recognition 
as concerning, but not be convinced of the value of an outright ban. 
 121 See id. § 240.14a–8(i)–(j) (describing the reasons for which companies may exclude 
proposals, and the process they must follow to do so, including a requirement that companies 
planning to exclude proposals notify the Commission of their plans and reasoning). 
 122  See THE KROGER CO., NOTICE OF 2017 ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS: 2017 PROXY 
STATEMENT AND 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 53 (2017). 
 123 See Heather Haddon, Kroger to Ditch Plastic Bags by 2025, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2018, 6:30 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kroger-to-ditch-plastic-bags-by-2025-1535020200 [perma.cc/
PG8W-Y4TM]. Kroger’s packaging policy in place at the time of the vote stated: 
By 2020, Kroger will optimize packaging in Our Brands by following a balanced, multi-
pronged approach that considers design attributes including but not limited to food 
safety, shelf life, availability, quality, material type and source, function, recyclability and 
cost. Through the design optimization process, Kroger will strive to increase the 
recyclability of Our Brands manufactured plastic packaging. 
The Kroger Co., Schedule 14A Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (May 15, 2018). 
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Similarly, such an investor might oppose gender pay disparities but 
question the value of board diversity requirements. 
Remember, too, the companies in ESG fund portfolios are often 
selected for inclusion because of their comparatively high ESG 
performance. This selection bias may lead ESG fund managers to prefer 
the ESG plans and prerogatives of portfolio company management to 
those advocated by shareholder proposals. It also likely explains the 
relative paucity of climate change proposals we unearthed in our 2018 
samples. As noted in Appendix III, when compiling the 2018 voting 
records, we searched only for proposals addressing climate change 
specifically. We were disappointed this search yielded relatively few 
proposals. To draw in a more representative “E” sample for the 2019 data 
reported in Table 4, we also include proposals more broadly addressing 
issues of sustainability, but there were still fewer of these proposals than 
in our other categories.  
Research has also shown that fund families frequently choose to vote 
all shares owned by their constituent funds consistently, rather than 
voting holdings on a fund-by-fund basis to accord with investor 
preferences particular to individual funds.124 Where deviation from 
centralized voting decisions occurs, it is primarily to enable divergent 
votes by active funds. Cost pressure and other efficiency concerns and the 
desire to maximize a fund family’s influence with portfolio companies 
and in the market may motivate this kind of batch voting. But it will often 
lead to undermining investor expectations of ESG funds.125 ESG 
proposals can be expensive to implement. A non-specialist fund family 
 124 See Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 517 
(2018) (reporting that “[t]he Big Three closely adhere to their voting guidelines and are thus able 
to achieve lock-step consistency in voting across funds” in an article arguing that passive funds 
should not vote their shares); Ann M. Lipton, Family Loyalty: Mutual Fund Voting and Fiduciary 
Obligation, 19 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 175, 187–89 (2017) (criticizing the practice of fund 
families voting all funds “as a block” and canvassing potential reforms); Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy 
S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1151 (2019) (pointing
out this practice in work and setting out a taxonomy of conflicts it creates); Griffith, supra note 34, 
at 12–16 (describing this common practice). 
125 As the literature in supra note 124 articulated, centralized voting by fund families will 
virtually always undermine the preferences of some of their investors. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 
124, at 189–92. Commentators have offered a range of potential reforms to address the issue. See 
e.g., Griffith, supra note 34, at 33–48 (arguing both for decentralization of mutual fund voting and 
to remove the default practice of mutual fund voting for ESG shareholder proposals). See generally 
Lipton, supra note 124, at 187–89 (canvassing potential reforms). 
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overall may view the potential financial return on ESG gains as 
insufficient to justify these extra expenses in order to achieve ESG gains, 
even if managers and investors of its ESG funds would differ.  
Centralized voting practices like these could explain the many 
surprising Vanguard FTSE Social Index votes. No-votes by this passive 
ESG fund are matched by nearly identical votes opposing environmental, 
gender/diversity, and political spending proposals by the two Vanguard 
funds in our non-ESG sample. Still, centralized voting is clearly not a 
universal practice. BlackRock’s iShares’ ESG funds votes supporting ESG 
proposals in 2018 diverged notably from the record of the non-ESG 
iShares Core S&P ETF. For example, its MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF fund 
voted against management and in favor of proposals to report on the 
gender pay gap, lobbying payments, board diversity, and global content 
management at Alphabet that year, resolutions its Core S&P 500 ETF 
opposed. In 2019, however, iShares’ ESG and non-ESG voting patterns 
look much more similar.   
Funds may also be using engagement strategies other than 
shareholder proposal votes to pursue their ESG goals. Particularly for 
large players like the passive Big Three,126 interventions at the board or 
executive level may be viewed by fund managers as more important or 
effective ways to generate improved ESG performance at portfolio 
companies. Although voluntary engagement or stewardship reporting 
has become more common, the precise contours of this kind of influence 
will remain opaque to investors and other stakeholders.  
The most worrisome explanation, of course, is that some ESG fund 
sponsors and managers are not as committed to the pursuit of ESG 
performance as their branding suggests. Funds meet their fiduciary and 
securities law obligations by establishing a share-voting policy consistent 
with their clients’ best interests, disclosing the policy to their clients, 
and reporting their votes annually to the SEC.127 Recent SEC Guidance 
 126 Often referred to as the “Big Three,” BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street now dominate 
U.S. passive investing, managing over ninety percent of AUM. See Fichtner et al., supra note 7, at 
303–04. 
 127 Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management 
Investment Companies Release Nos. 8188, 25922, 47304, 33-8188, 34-47304, IC-25922 , 2003 WL 
215451 (Jan. 31, 2003); Proxy Voting by Investment Advisors Release Nos. 2106, IA-2106, 79 S.E.C. 
Docket 1673 (Jan. 31, 2003) (announcing the disclosure regulation and discussing mutual fund 
voting more generally); see also Lipton, supra note 124, at 183–87 (discussing the history and 
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reminds funds that compliance with their obligations in voting client 
shares turns on serving the client’s best interest and warns that funds may 
not woodenly rely on the recommendations of proxy advisors.128 SEC 
Guidance recommends a fund “consider how its fiduciary duty and its 
[securities law] obligations . . . apply when it has multiple clients” such as 
“funds, other pooled investment vehicles, and individual investors, with 
differing investment objectives and strategies,” but does not require fund 
families to establish and follow fund-by-fund voting policies.129 Funds 
can apply their client-best-interest policy based on their analysis of voting 
questions or carefully vet and regularly monitor proxy advisors to whom 
they delegate such tasks. Either way, no specific voting content is 
required. 
A faithless ESG fund sponsor or manager incurs little regulatory risk 
by opposing an ESG-enhancing shareholder proposal, so long as doing so 
is justified by their client-best-interest policy. Risks from detection by 
investors themselves are also minimal. Investors expecting their ESG 
fund managers to assiduously pursue ESG performance—whether 
because they believe this performance will improve financial returns or 
because they care about these factors for non-financial reasons—can 
review these votes only if they are extraordinarily diligent.130 Few are 
likely to do so, though, especially across the long list of portfolio 
companies contained in a fund and over time. Even for those investors 
willing to engage in this effort, their only recourse in the event of a 
development of these requirements); Griffith, supra note 34, at 13–16 (relating the history and 
noting that while SEC rules—unlike ERISA regulation—do not issue a directive to vote every share, 
it has become “the standard practice of mutual funds”). 
 128 Commission Guidance Regarding Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers, 
SEC Guidance Release Nos. IA-5325, IC-33605, 2019 WL 4303125, at *15–16 (Aug. 21, 2019). 
 129 Id. at *13–14. Anticipated additional SEC regulations of proxy advisors will likely require 
them to offer issuers two opportunities for advance review of proxy voting materials they plan to 
circulate and to increase the thresholds for defeated proposals to be resubmitted to shareholders at 
subsequent meetings. See Patrick Temple-West & Kadhim Shubber, US SEC to Propose Regulations 
for Proxy Advisers, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/778602a8-f6b1-11e9-
a79c-bc9acae3b654 [https://perma.cc/B35U-QT44]. 
 130 See Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 235–36 (2018) 
(describing the voluminous nature of this reporting and summarizing the problem as “there is 
currently no way for mutual fund investors to gain a comprehensive view of the voting of the mutual 
funds in which they invest or may wish to invest”). Our own efforts confirm the burden and barriers 
associated with attempts to do so. 
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shareholder proposal vote with which they disagree will be to sell their 
holdings in the fund.   
Mismatch of ESG investor expectations and ESG fund practices is a 
particular concern in the passive context. In an active fund, fund 
managers use portfolio composition (both buy and sell) to voice ESG 
preferences even if they do not do so by voting on shareholder 
proposals.131 Passive funds have far less ability to exercise voice through 
exit, amplifying the importance of vote as ESG voice and signal. Our 
sample provides some cause for optimism on this score, as it does not 
reveal notable differences in voting activity between active and passive 
funds. That said, a finding that passive ESG funds voted more frequently 
or consistently for ESG proposals than their active counterparts would 
have been more encouraging. Of course, our sample is illustrative rather 
than comprehensive, and its fundamental finding is one of variation. 
Whether actively or passively managed, the fact that a fund brands itself 
as ESG gives investors no assurance of how it will vote its shares.  
5. Unique Passive Risks: Tracking Errors
Tracking error, the final fund attribute our study reviews, is unique 
to index investing. Passive funds constructed against an index necessarily 
fall short of replicating that index exactly. Tracking error measures this 
divergence between a fund’s performance and the performance of the 
index that the fund is tracking.132 Tracking error results from various 
causes, including transaction and rebalancing costs, uninvested cash 
(drag), differing dividend reinvestment practices, securities lending, 
omitted dividend taxes from the index, sampling errors or divergent 
techniques, variable swap spreads, variable total expense ratios, fund 
operational risks, and choosing the right benchmark index.133 Average 
131 The authors thank Sean Griffith for this insight. 
 132 See e.g., iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF, supra note 61. Tracking error “measures the 
quality of index replication, i.e. how well a fund manager replicates the performance of a specific 
index.” BEN JOHNSON ET AL., MORNINGSTAR, ON THE RIGHT TRACK: MEASURING TRACKING 
EFFICIENCY IN ETFS 5 (2013), https://media.morningstar.com/uk/MEDIA/Research_Paper/
Morningstar_Report_Measuring_Tracking_Efficiency_in_ETFs_February_2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BT84-T5R3] [hereinafter MS Tracking Report]. 
133 See MS Tracking Report, supra note 132, at 5–8. 
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tracking error134 for our ESGP sample is 1.67, whereas the average ETF 
tracking error is 0.59.135   
All indexed funds face risks associated with indexing itself, including 
errors in data, computation, and indexing methodology. iShares funds 
disclose the following standard language:  
Errors in index data, index computations or the construction of 
the Underlying Index in accordance with its methodology may 
occur from time to time and may not be identified and corrected 
by the Index Provider for a period of time or at all, which may 
have an adverse impact on the Fund and its shareholders.136  
While these errors exist with standard index funds, the risks are likely 
amplified with indexed ESG funds, especially compared to a standard 
S&P 500 index fund.137 ESG index methodology is opaque as to the 
criteria, weights, and balance. There is also greater index asset valuation 
variation with ESG indices, driven by a particular index’s ESG preference 
compared with standard financial performance measures in traditional 
indices.  
Table 5 reports tracking errors in our sample of ESGP funds. 
Obtaining tracking errors was a challenge and thus the following is 
illustrative of the range of tracking errors, rather than a strict comparison 
of absolutes. Further, calculating tracking errors, in general, is a process 
itself that can be rife with errors given the volume of data, misaligned 
data, and calculation errors.138 Please see the associated footnotes for 
additional information on the figures presented.139 
 134 See infra note 139. The above reported ranges were averaged for a single tracking error and 
that estimated annualized errors are used in the calculations. Average excludes funds for which 
there was no reported tracking error. 
 135 See Lara Crigger, The Top 7 Socially Responsible ETFs, ETF.COM (Mar. 1, 2017), 
https://www.etf.com/publications/etfr/top-7-socially-responsible-etfs [https://perma.cc/VZW4-
62E8]. 
136 iShares MSCI USA ESG Select ETF, supra note 60. 
137 See MORNINGSTAR, PASSIVE SUSTAINABLE FUNDS, supra note 35, at 22–23. 
138 See MS Tracking Report, supra note 132, at 10. 
139 Challenges to obtaining tracking errors included different years reporting the tracking errors 
(2017–2018) and different time periods of reported tracking errors ranging from monthly 
(annualized to create estimated annual) errors to one-, three- and five-year errors. Unlike other 
information reported in this Article, we were not able to obtain (or verify) tracking errors from SEC 
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Table 5: 2018 Tracking Errors 
Fund Tracking 
Error 
Vanguard FTSE Social Index Inv.  1 
Calvert US Large Cap Core Rspn Idx I 1.41-1.69140 
iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF 1.65 
PowerShares Water Resources ETF 1.2141
PAX MSCI EAFE ESG Leaders Index Instl 2.49-2.57142 
iShares MSCI USA ESG Select ETF - 
Guggenheim S&P Global Water ETF 2.02143 
iShares MSCI ACWI Low Carbon Target 
ETF - 
Calvert Global Water A 2.77144 
Guggenheim Solar ETF 2.05145 
Green Century MSCI International Index 
Fund - Institution 
- 
Praxis Growth Index Fund A 0.67 
Praxis International Index A - 
Praxis Value Index A   1.26 
High tracking error does not necessarily mean poor relative financial 
performance and vice versa with low tracking errors.146 Yet, “[t]here is 
filings directly, but rather we relied exclusively on third party presentations of the data, often from 
state retirement plan documents, internal fund reports, and other sources. 
140 Variation reflects a three- and five-year reported tracking error. 
 141 Estimated annualized tracking error determined from reported monthly tracking error of 
0.12. 
142 Three-year reported tracking error; variation depends upon class. 
143 Estimated annualized tracking error determined from reported monthly tracking error of 
0.34. 
144 Five-year reported tracking error. 
 145 Estimated annualized tracking error determined from reported monthly tracking error of 
0.35. 
146 See MS Tracking Report, supra note 132, at 3. Further, for the ETF funds, tracking error is 
an incomplete measure; tracking error alone does not capture “the actual magnitude” of under or 
over performance. Id. at 9. Tracking difference is “the annualised difference between a fund’s actual 
return and its benchmark return over a specific period of time.” Id. Low tracking difference signals 
that the ETF is matchings its stated index. Id. 
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usually a trade-off between ESG performance and tracking error.”147 
Within our limited review of ESGP Funds, ten funds disclosed specific 
investment risks associated with indexed investing and tracking errors.148 
The risk disclosures varied in content and complexity from generic 
disclosures149 to a comprehensive mini treatise on tracking errors at 408 
words provided by a Guggenheim fund, S&P Global Water ETF, a sector-
focused index fund.150  
Examples of disclosed ESG tracking error include asset, pricing, 
transaction, and objective differences between the index and fund. For 
example, a fund may hold different assets from the underlying index 
because of a representative sampling approach, limited availability of the 
security in the amount needed to match the index, uninvested cash for 
liquidity, or even tax motivations.151 Transaction costs and timing are also 
commonly disclosed as additional expenses which contribute to tracking 
error.152 Such costs that negatively affect index tracking may include the 
costs associated with rebalancing a portfolio to match the index and 
account for size or additional brokerage fees, and expense ratios.153 
Further, pricing differences between fair value and end of the day net 
asset value (NAV) may also drive different returns between the index (fair 
value) and the fund (NAV).154 The use of stewardship and investment 
 147 MORNINGSTAR, PASSIVE SUSTAINABLE FUNDS, supra note 35, at 21; see also id. at 22–23 
(explaining that as funds seek greater impact, tracking error rises compared to the broader market). 
148 Notes on file with author. 
 149 “Asset Class Risk—The securities in the Fund’s portfolio may underperform the returns of 
other securities or indices that track other industries, markets, asset classes or sectors.” Guggenheim 
S&P Glob. Water Index ETF, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Dec. 29, 2017). 
150 Id. 
151 See, e.g., iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF, supra note 61 (describing asset differences); see 
also Guggenheim Solar ETF, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Dec. 29, 2017) (providing a 
comprehensive discussion of tracking errors). 
 152 “Tracking error also may result because the Fund incurs fees and expenses, while the 
Underlying Index does not.” iShares MSCI ACWI Low Carbon Target ETF, supra note 76. 
 153 “Factors such as Fund expenses, imperfect correlation between the Fund’s investments and 
the Index, rounding of share prices, changes to the composition of the Index, regulatory policies, 
high portfolio turnover rate and the use of leverage all contribute to tracking error.” Calvert US 
Large-Cap Core Responsible Index Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (June 15, 2018). 
154
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screens to alter the indexed portfolio may also contribute to performance 
deviations.155 Finally, some funds may deviate from an index in a hybrid 
passive/active strategy and go outside of an index to bolster returns 
(financial, ESG, or both) through active investment.156 
Tracking error, a problem with all indexed investments, may be 
amplified with ESGP Funds given the opacity of ESG indices, variation in 
index attributes, and market size of ESG companies.157 Investors bear the 
actual costs of high tracking errors, plus the added burden of evaluating 
tracking error risks without transparency.  
6. Summary
Reviewing the investment strategy disclosures, fees, portfolio 
holdings, and voting practices of our sample funds reinforces concerns 
that ESG investing, and passive ESG in particular, may have difficulty 
delivering on its tremendous promise. The price of ESG investment 
products, while decreasing in response to competition, remains high. 
Although evidence is mounting that better financial returns are 
associated with considering ESG factors in making investments, high fees 
can quickly eliminate marginal improvements in financial performance. 
ESG investing in practice also includes investment products with a very 
broad range of investment strategies, with often little detail on the 
contours of a given fund’s ESG practices and commitments. Even vague 
definitions can suffice to meet funds’ securities law disclosure obligations 
To the extent the Fund calculates its NAV based on fair value prices and the value of the 
Index is based on the securities’ closing prices (i.e., the value of the Index is not based on 
fair value prices), the Fund’s ability to track the Index may be adversely affected. 
Guggenheim S&P Glob. Water Index ETF, supra note 149. 
 155 “Application of Stewardship Investing screens may contribute to tracking error.” Praxis 
Growth Index Fund A, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (April 30, 2018). 
 156 See Passive and Enhanced Passive Strategies, PRI, https://www.unpri.org/listed-equity/esg-
integration-in-passive-and-enhanced-passive-strategies/15.article [https://perma.cc/ERK5-LHLG] 
(describing “enhanced passive” ESG investing as “using the index and its constituent weights as the 
core of the portfolio, and engaging in restricted active strategies, including divesting certain 
securities, adjusting the weights of constituents and trading derivatives”). 
 157 For example, smaller capitalization companies introduce higher potential transaction costs 
associated with market depth and contribute to price volatility when a fund must buy or sell shares 
to maintain index exposure. Anne M. Tucker & Holly van den Toorn, Will Swing Pricing Save 
Sedentary Shareholders?, 18 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 130, 140 (2018). 
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but leave investors without a clear understanding of how ESG investing 
will be practiced by a particular fund and make it difficult to compare 
across offerings.   
Investigating holdings and voting patterns slightly clarifies this 
murky picture, with specialist funds and fund providers emerging as 
more often offering distinct—though not necessarily superior—ESG 
investment products. Funds targeting particular industries or 
sustainability themes offer highly tailored, specialized portfolios that do 
not overlap with other funds and do not focus on mainstream 
investments in household name companies shared by both more general 
ESG and non-ESG funds. In contrast, broad-based ESG and non-ESG 
funds appear to invest in largely similar portfolios. Specialist fund 
providers often, though certainly not always, appear to use voting on 
shareholder proposals to bolster their ESG goals, and generalist players 
post an eclectic mix of results. Perhaps ironically, the consistent finding 
of our study is one of variation. The funds diverge so widely on our 
various metrics that it will be extremely difficult for an investor to know 
what she is getting when she invests in an ESG fund.  
Passive ESG largely replicates these general concerns, but also 
introduces new ones. ESG investors who choose index funds will 
generally save on expense ratios when compared to active ESG funds. 
Still, fees for ESG index funds are higher than industry averages, raising 
the specter of cost overwhelming any additional gains. The problems with 
vague disclosures about ESG investment strategies, portfolio holdings 
that align with non-ESG funds, and wide-ranging voting patterns appear 
in active and passive ESG funds alike. The confounding element of 
tracking error, however, is unique to the passive context. Some level of 
tracking error is an unavoidable feature of passive strategies; it represents 
deviation from the underlying index and need not undermine the 
financial performance of a fund. In ESG Index funds, however, investors 
will find it difficult to achieve both the low tracking error typical of 
broadly diversified funds and strong ESG performance.   
The passive ESG trend also compounds the already high level of 
opacity in ESG investing. Tracking an index adds another—very 
private—layer to a fund’s ESG strategy. Index purveyors argue they are 
offering fund providers the deep expertise needed to evaluate ESG factors, 
topics on which investment fund experience is shallow. But proprietary 
indices designed by private firms like MSCI make it ever more difficult 
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for investors to understand and assess the particular version of ESG a 
fund pursues.   
Beyond concerns about delivering on investors’ expectations from 
ESG funds is skepticism that funds can deliver on improved portfolio 
firm behavior, especially around environmental and social practices.158 
When ESG can be any combination of the initiatives—environmental, 
social, or governance—we suspect that governance attributes are often 
pursued over environmental or social attributes because funds and index 
providers alike prefer easily tracked ESG practices that are linked to firm 
profits and applicable across a range of firms.  
The ESG investment landscape, facilitated by an unregulated ESG 
market, is heterogeneous and opaque. This, combined with investor 
heterogeneity—issues we further explore in the next two Sections—make 
the task of matching high ESG-committed investors and investment 
products arduous. 
II. DEMAND
Despite the significant ESG variation and opacity that the literature 
describes159 and our data confirm, a range of investors are flocking to 
active and passive ESG. Matching ESG-motivated investors to the right 
fund is a multifaceted problem. Investor heterogeneity and intermediated 
transactions complicate a potential ESG match. This Part will explore the 
diverse set of investors driving ESG asset growth and factors shaping their 
choice of ESG investment strategy. 
Investor demand for ESG products is far from monolithic. 
Individual investors have a range of ESG commitments and fall along a 
spectrum of “willingness to pay” for the ESG they desire.160 As a group, 
individual investors also have different preferences and requirements 
than institutional investors, even though institutions often serve as 
intermediaries and aggregators for individual investors’ portfolios. There 
are also many different types of institutional investors, whose interest in 
ESG investing differs by client base, regulatory regime, geography, and 
 158 Brest et al., supra note 17, at 13 (expressing deep skepticism that investment in public 
markets can ever change portfolio company behavior). 
159 Id. at 1; Barber et al., supra note 17, at 2; Gezcy et al., supra note 17, at 23. 
160 Barber et al., supra note 17, at 29. 
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other factors. These variations in investor demand for ESG investment 
products partly explain the variation in ESG product offerings, as 
investors bring their own preferences to bear on market developments 
and their appetites and attitudes influence product development. Perhaps 
these various segments of the ESG investment market are indeed getting 
matched with the ESG they are willing to pay for, but perhaps not.   
Individual investor interest in ESG investing is significant and 
growing.161 In part, this growth can be explained by the simple desire to 
align one’s investments with one’s values, in the same way individuals 
want to feel the warm glow of other products and services they 
consume.162 The shopper who favors Fair Trade coffee to channel her 
grocery expenditures to small growers or selects a pink yogurt cup to 
support breast cancer research may likewise favor ESG investing over a 
standard approach. It is worth noting that our hypothetical “she” is 
indeed more likely to be female, and younger than the average investor. 
Interest in sustainable and ESG investing appears concentrated in women 
and millennials.163 While fifty-three percent of all respondents in a 2018 
survey of high net worth individuals stated that “ESG trade record” was 
important in making investment decisions, sixty-four percent of women 
and eighty-seven percent of millennials did so.164 More granular research 
 161 See MORNINGSTAR, supra note 3, at 1 (collecting studies indicating growing individual 
investor interest in sustainable investing). 
 162 See Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1259–1260 (2011) (describing 
the economic concept of warm glow as “the utility one derives from giving” but noting that 
companies engaging in corporate social responsibility now frequently sell it). 
 163 See, e.g., Carol J. Clouse, The New Allure of Sustainable Investing, BARRON’S (June 9, 2018), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-new-allure-of-sustainable-investing-1528502401 
[https://perma.cc/3DQS-G4SL] (“While much of the financial industry’s focus on ESG skews 
toward the young folks, surveys indicate that women’s interest in this approach is nearly as high as 
millennials’.”); John Waggoner, Millennials, Women Drive Assets to ESG Strategies, INV. NEWS 
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20171107/FREE/171109942/millennials-
women-drive-assets-to-esg-strategies [https://perma.cc/37NA-8A4M] (reporting panelists’ 
comments at an industry event that “[t]wo groups of people—women and Millennials—are 
responsible for the doubling of ESG assets to $8.1 trillion worldwide since 2014”); Beth Brearley, 
ESG and Women Investors: A Meeting of Movements, INV. WEEK (Oct. 10, 2018), 
https://www.investmentweek.co.uk/investment-week/opinion/3063826/a-meeting-of-
movements-as-industry-joins-forces [https://perma.cc/Y4ZJ-E2AP] (similar). 
 164 2018 U.S. Trust Insights on Wealth and Worth Survey, BANK AM. (June 2018), 
https://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/system/files/2018_US_Trust_Insights_on_Wealth_and_W
orth_Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VSZ-FCC8]; see also MORGAN STANLEY, SUSTAINABLE 
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on the level of ESG impact these more motivated investors are seeking, 
and their willingness to pay for it, requires further study.  
No matter the demographic, however, individual investor 
preferences are often translated through an array of investment 
intermediaries (some of which are themselves institutional investors, or 
agents of institutional investors). Brokers, investment advisors, family 
wealth officers, and pension and retirement plan fiduciaries all channel 
individuals’ money into investment products on behalf of their clients 
and beneficiaries. These intermediaries’ interest in ESG strategies varies 
considerably depending on the type of investor they represent and the 
regulatory regime they confront. On the one hand, financial advisors’ 
appetite for ESG offerings is significant and growing. A 2018 study of 
these intermediaries, who counsel individual savers about their 
investment choices, found twenty-six percent currently use or 
recommend ESG funds to clients and twenty percent “expect to increase 
[their] recommendation” of such funds “over the next 12 months.”165 On 
the other hand, pension and retirement plan fiduciaries’ appetite for ESG 
investments is mixed.166 
The staggering growth of ESG investing over the last decade is also 
fueled by uptake from institutional investors.167 A 2017 State Street global 
study of institutional investors found eighty percent use ESG strategies as 
part of their portfolios, representing a wide range of levels of adoption.168 
SIGNALS: NEW DATA FROM THE INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR (2017), https://www.morganstanley.com/
pub/content/dam/msdotcom/ideas/sustainable-signals/pdf/Sustainable_Signals_Whitepaper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc./P55M-3PLG](reporting seventy-five percent of investors are interested in 
sustainable investing, and eighty-six percent of millennials are also interested). 
 165 FIN. PLANNING ASS’N, 2018 TRENDS IN INVESTING SURVEY 2, 4 (2018), 
https://www.onefpa.org/business-success/Documents/2018%20Trends%20in%
20Investing%20Survey%20Report%20-%20FIN.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7TC-PG54]. 
166 See infra text accompanying notes 175–191. 
 167 See MORNINGSTAR, supra note 3, at 1 (citing GLOB. SUSTAINABLE INV. ALL., 2016 GLOBAL 
SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT REVIEW (2017)). 
168 See STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, ESG INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SURVEY: PERFORMING FOR 
THE FUTURE 6–7 (2017), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-
governance/2018/04/esg-institutional-investor-survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/JP3G-LVJD]. A 
Morgan Stanley survey of “public and corporate pensions, endowments, foundations, sovereign 
wealth entities, insurance companies and other large asset owners worldwide” returned similar 
results, with “84% of the asset owners” surveyed at least “actively considering” integrating ESG 
criteria into their investment process, with nearly half already integrating it across all their 
investment decisions. Morgan Stanley Survey Finds Sustainable Investing Momentum High Among 
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Results among U.S. institutional investors were strong as well, with “27% 
of investors incorporat[ing] ESG factors in at least half of their 
investments.”169 Many of these institutional investors are now committed 
to the Principles for Responsible Investment,170 which now boasts over 
2,300 signatories managing over $86 trillion in assets.171 Signatories to 
this project, supported by the United Nations and developed by a group 
of institutional investors,172 pledge to “incorporate ESG issues into 
investment analysis and decision-making processes” and to engage in 
active ownership around these issues.173 Every type of institutional 
investor can be found amongst the PRI’s signatories: sovereign wealth 
funds, public and private pension funds, insurance companies, 
foundations and other endowments, and, of course, investment 
companies. These distinct types of institutional investors participate in 
ESG investing at quite different rates, perhaps indicating a range of 
willingness on their part—and the part of the investors they often 
represent—to bear ESG investing’s cost. 
A. Pioneers and Major Players
Sovereign wealth funds and U.S. and worldwide public pension 
funds were early adopters of ESG investing practices, and today represent 
the largest investors in this growing market.174 The Norwegian 
Asset Owners, MORGAN STANLEY (June 18, 2018), https://www.morganstanley.com/press-
releases/morgan-stanley-survey-finds-sustainable-investing-momentum-high [https://perma.cc/
TL4M-KE49]. 
169 See STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, supra note 168, at 7. 
 170 See PRI, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT: ANNUAL REPORT 2018, at 25 (2018), 
https://d8g8t13e9vf2o.cloudfront.net/Uploads/g/f/c/priannualreport_605237.pdf 
[htpps://perma.cc/3JFF-6KGK] (identifying the United States as “PRI’s largest market, with more 
than 345 signatories managing US$36 trillion”); MORNINGSTAR, supra note 3, at 27 (reporting that 
“[v]irtually all of the largest fund companies in the U.S. are now signatories”). 
171 See About the PRI, PRI, https://www.unpri.org/pri/about-the-pri [https://perma.cc/N4QA-
JQ39] (click on “Data and methodology available here, updated annually”). 
172 See About the PRI, supra note 171.  
 173 See What Are the Principles for Responsible Investment?, PRI, https://www.unpri.org/pri/
what-are-the-principles-for-responsible-investment [https://perma.cc/BH7E-5364]. 
174 See Tom Arnold, Socially Responsible Investing Catching on Among Sovereign Funds: Study, 
REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2019, 8:50 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swf-markets-
environment/socially-responsible-investing-catching-on-among-sovereign-funds-study-
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Government Pension Fund Global is the world’s largest sovereign wealth 
fund and a source of its public pension funding.175 It has been a pioneer 
in this area, first focusing on sustainable investment in 2001.176 The 
Norwegian fund continued to expand its ESG focus over the ensuing 
years, in response to government mandates.177 Today it asserts that 
“[g]ood financial return over time is deemed to be contingent on a 
sustainable development in economic, environmental and social terms, 
and on well-functioning, efficient and legitimate financial markets.”178 
Toward this end, it both excludes firms from its portfolio based on 
environmental and social goals, and practices engagement on these issues 
with the firms in which it invests.179   
Regulation also focuses sovereign wealth/public pension funds in 
other European nations on ESG investment by requiring pension funds 
to report on how they incorporate ESG in their investment strategies.180 
Beginning in 2016, the EU required member states to allow fiduciaries of 
occupational retirement funds to consider ESG factors in investment 
decisions and to mandate that these funds include in their investment 
idUSKBN1WF1DJ?smbl=esg [https://perma.cc/E46M-DMX9] (describing an Invesco study 
finding the already heavily ESG-engaged sovereign wealth segment continues to expand its ESG 
investing activity, moving from forty-six percent “includ[ing] a top-down ESG policy” in 2017 to 
sixty percent in 2019). 
 175 See The Government Pension Fund, GOVERNMENT.NO, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/
topics/the-economy/the-government-pension-fund/id1441 [https://perma.cc/JH2B-UKAP]; 
David Reid, Norway’s $1 Trillion Sovereign Wealth Fund Grows Despite a Volatile Quarter for 
Markets, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/21/norways-1-trillion-sovereign-wealth-fund-
enjoys-returns-on-stocks-and-bonds.html [https://perma.cc/TA3B-X7AM] (identifying Norway’s 
sovereign wealth fund as “[t]he world’s largest”). 
 176 See Beate Sjåfjell et al., Investing in Sustainability or Feeding on Stranded Assets? The 
Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 949, 956–57 (2017). 
177 See id. at 956–60. 
178 See The Government Pension Fund, supra note 175. 
179 See Sjåfjell et al., supra note 176, at 959–60. 
180 See ERNST & YOUNG, INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE TOMORROW: ESG INTEGRATION IN 
EUROPEAN PENSIONS 6 (2017), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-investing-in-a-
sustainable-tomorrow/$FILE/ey-investing-in-a-sustainable-tomorrow.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8E43-2TD6] (summarizing European public pension fund ESG investment and regulation); see also 
Attracta Mooney, ESG Wake-Up Call for Pension Laggards, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/a681b422-91a3-11e8-9609-3d3b945e78cf [https://perma.cc/4UMM-
7PLB] (describing new UK rules that would require pension plan “trustees who disregard the long-
term financial risks or opportunities from ESG will have to justify why this does not hurt their 
investment returns”). 
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policy disclosures how they take ESG issues into account in their 
investment practices.181 Just three years later, the European Parliament 
and EU member states agreed to extend these obligations to require 
institutional and other asset managers to integrate ESG factors into their 
investment decisions and to promulgate a uniform system for ESG 
disclosure by financial market participants.182 Even before the EU 
mandate, European assets made up a majority of the global ESG 
investment market.183 The implementation of mandatory ESG 
integration across the EU market will only further swell ESG assets under 
management globally. Uniform disclosure demanded by this massive 
market share, when distilled and disseminated by investment 
intermediaries could also improve all investors’ ability to match the ESG 
strategies they select to their preferences.  
Although European players are in the lead, U.S. public pension 
assets are not far behind.184 One recent report finds public funds 
represent fifty-four percent of U.S. ESG assets held by institutional 
 181 See Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 
2016 on the Activities and Supervision of Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision 
(IORPs), 2016 O.J. (L 354) 37, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%
3A32016L2341 [https://perma.cc/QN9Z-9468]. 
 182 See Press Release, European Comm’n, Capital Markets Union: Commission Welcomes 
Agreement on Sustainable Investment Disclosure Rules (Mar. 7, 2019), https://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-19-1571_en.htm [https://perma.cc/5MVE-F32E]. This proposal was part of 
a suite of three proposed by the European Commission to improve capital deployment toward 
sustainable development. See id. Interest in ESG regulation in Europe continues. Steven Maijoor, 
Chair, European Sec. & Mkts. Auth., Sustainable Financial Markets: Translating Changing Risks 
and Investor Preferences into Regulatory Action (Feb. 12, 2020) (suggesting EU would also be 
moving on issuer disclosure regulation and anti-greenwashing efforts). 
 183 See GLOB. SUSTAINABLE INV. ALL., 2016 GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT REVIEW 7 
(2017), http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/GSIR_Review2016.F.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/64L4-LBTQ] (finding fifty-three percent of the $22.89 trillion in global 
sustainable investments were in Europe); see also MORNINGSTAR, PASSIVE SUSTAINABLE FUNDS, 
supra note 35, at 6 (noting European dominance in passive sustainable investing as well, citing “an 
almost unbroken stream of positive quarterly net inflows”); Sustainable Investing Grows on 
Pensions, Millennials, supra note 4 (“Europe leads markets with about half of managed assets 
considering sustainability criteria, though growth appears to have leveled off (partly affected by 
methodology changes). Canada and U.S. interest continues to increase, while Japan is rising rapidly 
on government governance and pension fund efforts.”). 
 184 See Chris Taylor, Sustainable Investing’s Secret Weapon: Public Pensions, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 
2018, 12:52 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-money-investment-esg/sustainable-
investings-secret-weapon-public-pensions-idUSKCN1NH24M [https://perma.cc/7RMV-ZCSW]. 
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investors.185 California’s CalPERS and CalSTRS funds and the New York 
State Common Retirement Fund, the three largest U.S. public pension 
funds, have made explicit commitments to incorporate ESG into their 
investment decisions.186 Starting in 2020, California law requires its 
public pension funds to report on the climate risk187 in their portfolios, 
which may force them to seek out investment products with deeper and 
more accountable ESG commitments.   
American public pension funds also practice engagement. They vote 
their shares directly, even when they invest through intermediary asset 
managers that vote on behalf of their other investor clients.188 They seek 
informal influence with company leaders. They even take the more 
 185 See US SIF, REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS 
2018, at 4–5 (2018), https://www.ussif.org/files/Trends/Trends%202018%20executive%
20summary%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8AQ-PMX6]. 
 186 See, e.g., Environmental, Social, & Governance Integration, CALPERS, 
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/sustainable-investments-program/esg-integration 
[https://perma.cc/3DMV-X7WK] (last updated July 15, 2019) (“In 2016, each asset class developed 
a set of sustainable investment practice guidelines that reflects their needs and strategies.”); ESG 
Investment Policy, CALSTRS, https://www.calstrs.com/esg-investment-policy [https://perma.cc/
JP8P-B8RP] (“CalSTRS incorporates PRI and other ESG principles into its investment policies and 
practices.”); Corporate Governance, OFF. N.Y. ST. COMPTROLLER, https://www.osc.state.ny.us/
pension/corporategovernance.htm [https://perma.cc/E22K-9RGK] (noting the New York Fund’s 
engagement with portfolio companies places emphasis on “environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) issues”); Press Release, Thomas P. DiNapoli, Office N.Y State Comptroller, State 
Comptroller DiNapoli Adds $3 Billion to the State Pension Fund’s Sustainable Investment Program 
(Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/dec18/120718.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8L7C-FE5R] (announcing the New York fund’s additional sustainable 
investment commitments, bringing its total to $10 billion); OFFICE N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER, 
NEW YORK STATE COMMON RETIREMENT FUND: ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE 
REPORT (2017) [hereinafter NEW YORK STATE COMMON RETIREMENT FUND], 
https://www.osc.state.ny.us/reports/esg-report-mar2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP4T-PKP2] 
(reporting on the New York Common Retirement Fund’s ESG strategy to “incorporate[] ESG 
analysis more formally into all aspects of its investment process”). 
 187  See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7510.5 (West 2019) (requiring the public employee and teachers’ 
retirement fund boards to “publicly report on its analysis of the climate-related financial risk of its 
public market portfolio, including the alignment of the fund with the Paris climate agreement and 
California climate policy goals and the exposure of the fund to long-term risks”). 
 188  See Griffith, supra note 34, at 9–10 (explaining that while “advisory firms require investors 
to delegate their voting rights as a condition to investing in the fund[,] . . . some large institutional 
investors—most notably, large pension funds—are able to negotiate exceptions to this rule”). 
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unusual step of filing shareholder proposals.189 New York funds have 
been leaders in this area. Of the seventy-nine unique proposals public 
pension funds proposed to public companies at 2019 meetings, the New 
York City Comptroller submitted fifty-two.190 The New York State 
Common Retirement Fund has also engaged heavily in this tactic, for 
example making forty-four proposals in 2018, most often addressing 
climate change, diversity, and political spending.191   
Public fund pioneers seeded the sustainable investing and ESG 
markets and continue to play major roles in this growing sector. As the 
number of jurisdictions mandating ESG integration and disclosure 
increases, so will the ability of these major market players to demand the 
data and candor they require to match the ESG preferences of their 
beneficiaries with available investment products. 
 189 See generally James R. Copland, Special Report: Public Pension Funds’ Shareholder-Proposal 
Activism, PROXY MONITOR, http://proxymonitor.org/forms/2015Finding3.aspx#notes 
[https://perma.cc/2XK5-2NHL] (examining public pension funds’ shareholder proposal activity 
and finding that “[f]rom 2006 to [2015], state and municipal pension funds have sponsored 300 
shareholder proposals at Fortune 250 companies. More than two-thirds of these were introduced 
by the pension funds for the public employees of New York City and State”). 
 190 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2019 PROXY SEASON REVIEW: PART 1: RULE 14A-8 
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 5 (2019), https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-2019-
Proxy-Season-Review-Part-1-Rule-14a-8-Shareholder-Proposals.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z42F-
875W]. In prior years, the Comptroller has sometimes submitted even more proposals. As part of 
its multi-season efforts to increase proxy access, the Comptroller submitted seventy-one proposals 
on the topic in the 2017 season alone. See N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, 2017 SHAREOWNER INITIATIVES: 
POST-SEASON REPORT 7, 11–13 (2017), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/
documents/2017_Shareowner_Initiatives_Postseason_Report.pdf https;//perma.cc/HR8B-BPJM] 
(detailing these efforts, as well as numerous shareholder proposals and other company 
engagements around gender pay equity, diversity, climate risk, and other ESG issues); see also 
DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON 
63–74 (2018) (describing the NYC Fund’s proxy access project in a work articulating the power and 
potential of pension funds more generally). 
 191 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2018 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 4 (2018), 
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-2018-Proxy-Season-Review.pdf 
[https;//perma.cc/46AW-3TKV]; see also NEW YORK STATE COMMON RETIREMENT FUND, supra 
note 186, at 4–6 (chronicling the Fund’s shareholder proposal and other engagement activities over 
several years). 
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B. Recent Converts
When and if this ability to make better matches increases, more 
recent converts to the ESG investing market will benefit as well. Insurance 
companies are one key group of recent converts. They have quickly 
become a large segment of the ESG investment market, and their demand 
for ESG investment products continues to grow.192 A 2018 global survey 
of insurers found that well over half of “North American (59%) and 
European (58%) insurers have already adopted an ESG investment 
policy,” and another quarter or more expected to do so in the next year.193 
Zurich Insurance Group positions ESG integration of its 
investments as part of achieving its core goals. It explains: “To reduce risk 
and to help communities. These are among Zurich’s aims in providing 
insurance, and in managing its customers’ premiums. Responsible 
investment promises to achieve both, which has led us to adopt it in 
theory and in practice.”194 Given insurers’ business exposure to 
environmental and social risks, especially those associated with climate 
change, they must hedge against these risks as they invest assets they will 
need to call upon to pay future claims.195 The Asset Owners Disclosure 
Project recently issued a report demonstrating how these sophisticated 
players are carefully matching their impact and cost preferences with 
particular ESG investment products—beyond mere investment in the 
 192 See PETER UHLENBRUCH, SHAREACTION, ASSET OWNERS DISCLOSURE PROJECT, INSURING A 
LOW-CARBON FUTURE (2019), https://aodproject.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/AODP-
Insuring-a-Low-Carbon-Future-Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SBT-2T3T] (canvassing how 
more than a dozen insurance companies worldwide are integrating climate awareness “into 
underwriting, investment, and group-wide risk management practices”). 
 193 BLACKROCK, GLOBAL INSURANCE REPORT 2018, at 33 (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/
institutions/en-us/literature/whitepaper/global-insurance-report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UK8A-7VGK]. 
 194 ZURICH, DOING WELL AND DOING GOOD: WHY ZURICH PRACTICES RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTMENT (2017), https://www.zurich.com/-/media/project/zurich/dotcom/sustainability/docs/
zurich-responsible-investment-position-statment-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/NX2S-6LYW]. 
 195 See William T.J. de la Mare, Locality of Harm: Insurance and Climate Change in the 21st 
Century, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 189, 197–98 (2013) (“The underwriting and investment sides of 
insurance companies are interlinked in the sense that when investment returns are good, the 
insurance company may lower its rates to make them more affordable or competitive . . . . [I]n years 
when losses are relatively high, the insurer can rely on investment returns to make up for 
underwriting losses.”). 
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types of ESG mutual and ETF funds reviewed in our study. Due to the 
unique risks of climate change to which they are responding, insurers in 
the United States and Europe are using asset-level climate scenario 
analysis in their investment strategies, seeking fixed income investments 
from issuers that contribute to and benefit from long-term sustainability, 
weighting their portfolios toward companies contributing to energy and 
environmental transition, investing in green bonds, and more.196  
Although tiny in terms of assets under management, some U.S. 
foundations and other charitable endowments have also begun to devote 
more of their portfolios to ESG investing. Efforts to align endowment 
investing with the charitable purposes of an organization is often called 
mission-related investing. This classification can also include “impact 
investing,” which more often occurs through private and specialized 
investments and can contemplate intentionally concessionary financial 
returns in service of generating positive social impact.197  
Until quite recently, many foundations worried managing their 
endowments to pursue social along with financial returns was at odds 
with their fiduciary obligations and tax law expectations about 
foundation investment practices. Guidance from the Treasury in 2015 
and the revised Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act 
clarified that foundation managers have discretion to invest in line with 
the charitable purposes of their organizations.198 The Ford Foundation 
credited the Treasury clarification as contributing to its decision to shift 
196 See ASSET OWNERS DISCLOSURE PROJECT, supra note 192, at 30–31. 
 197 See Christopher Geczy et al., In Pursuit of Good & Gold: Data Observations of Employee 
Ownership & Impact Investment, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 555, 560–63 (2017) (defining impact 
investment); Susan L. Abbott et al., Impact Investing for Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, 29 TAX’N 
EXEMPTS 17, 20 (2018) (distinguishing mission-related investment from other forms of impact 
investment). 
198 See Investments Made for Chariable Purpose: Notice 2015-62, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-drop/n-15-62.pdf [https://perma.cc/BME5-T6D3] (“When exercising ordinary business 
care and prudence in deciding whether to make an investment, foundation managers may consider 
all relevant facts and circumstances, including the relationship between a particular investment and 
the foundation’s charitable purposes.”); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT 
§ 3(a), (e)(1)(H) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006) (allowing
fiduciaries to “consider the charitable purposes of the institution” when making investment
choices); see also Gary, supra note 25, at 786–89 (discussing ESG investment by charitable
fiduciaries). 
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$1 billion of its endowment to mission-related investments;199 other 
foundation endowments large and small may follow suit.  
Even skeptics recognize the appeal of market-rate ESG investment 
products that can align a foundation endowment’s investment portfolio 
with its charitable mission.200 Investing foundation assets for social 
impact in products contemplating below-market risk-return profiles, on 
the other hand, remains controversial.201 The new regulatory flexibility 
embodied by the 2015 Treasury Guidance frees foundations to consider 
whether they are willing to pay for higher-cost, potentially greater impact 
ESG products. To do so, however, they will need to be able to discern 
among the vastly divergent ESG products on the market.   
C. Untapped Potential
Private retirement savers too may want to align their portfolios to 
their values, but the barriers to ESG investing by private U.S. retirement 
plan managers impose significant obstacles. ERISA fiduciary law properly 
focuses investment managers’ decision-making on financial returns,202 as 
experience has shown the risk of shortfalls in such plans are all too real. 
Each administration since the Clinton DOL has issued guidance 
clarifying these obligations for ERISA fiduciaries in the context of 
sustainable or socially responsible investments. The tone of these 
pronouncements has shifted back and forth—with Democratic 
administrations suggesting more openness and Republican ones 
 199 See Darren Walker, Unleashing the Power of Endowments: The Next Great Challenge for 
Philanthropy, FORD FOUND. (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-change-
blog/posts/unleashing-the-power-of-endowments-the-next-great-challenge-for-philanthropy 
[https://perma.cc/8P58-Y2MG]. 
 200 See, e.g., Marc Gunther, Hewlett Foundation’s Leader Makes a Case Against Impact Investing, 
31 CHRON. PHILANTHROPY 16 (2019) (reporting one foundation leader’s views against impact 
investing by foundations, but who still believes ESG investing strategies “are fine as long as they 
don’t sacrifice returns”). 
 201 See Marc Gunther, Doing Good and Doing Well, 31 CHRON. PHILANTHROPY 8 (2019) 
(reporting that “despite” considerable public discussion and advocacy for foundations to engage in 
impact investing, relatively few foundations engage in impact investing). 
 202 See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2018) (directing each ERISA fiduciary to “discharge his duties 
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries . . . (A) for the 
exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying 
reasonable expenses of administering the plan”). 
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expressing more skepticism—up through the Trump administration’s 
announcement in April 2018. Throughout, the upshot has remained the 
same. In the words of the most recent guidance, “ERISA fiduciaries may 
not sacrifice investment returns or assume greater investment risks as a 
means of promoting collateral social policy goals.”203  
Social policy considerations are not irrelevant; nor need ERISA 
fiduciaries be willfully blind to them. If non-financial issues will impact 
financial return, plans should consider them as they would any other 
factors in a prudent analysis of risk and return. However, “[f]iduciaries 
must not too readily treat ESG factors as economically relevant to the 
particular investment choices at issue when making a decision.”204  
Those investments that can achieve social policy goals without 
sacrificing financial return are permissible.205 Fiduciaries of ERISA-
regulated defined benefit plans, which steward plan assets to ensure 
specified payouts for recipients,206 can make ESG investments so long as 
they provide risk-adjusted market-rate returns. ESG investments may 
also be made available within ERISA-regulated defined contribution 
plans, also known as 401(k) or 403(b) plans, in which beneficiaries make 
their own investment choices among a menu of options curated by plan 
fiduciaries.207 Current DOL guidance explicitly states that including “a 
prudently selected, well managed, and properly diversified ESG-themed 
investment alternative”208 as one of several amongst which plan 
participants can choose can be permissible. It also emphasizes, however, 
that such choices are not appropriate default investment options, into 
which savers’ funds are placed unless they opt out.209  
The DOL’s various guidance documents in this area have also 
addressed shareholder engagement. Again, the tone of their 
 203 Memorandum from John J. Canary, Dir. Regulations & Interpretations, Dep’t Labor, Field 
Assistance Bulletin No. 2018-01 (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-
and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2018-01 [https://perma.cc/9XZS-KFQK]. 
204 See id. 
205 See id. 
206 See Anne Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution 
Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 155–57 (2013). 
207 See id. at 157. 
208 See Memorandum from John J. Canary, supra note 203. 
209 See id. 
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pronouncements tends to correlate with the policy preferences of the 
issuing administration. In its 2016 guidance, the Obama DOL stated that: 
[a]n investment policy that contemplates activities intended to
monitor or influence the management of corporations in which
the plan owns stock is consistent with a fiduciary’s obligations
under ERISA where the responsible fiduciary concludes that
there is a reasonable expectation that such monitoring or
communication with management, by the plan alone or together 
with other shareholders, is likely to enhance the value of the
plan’s investment in the corporation, after taking into account
the costs involved.210
It also specifically contemplated engagement on “policies and 
practices to address environmental or social factors that have an impact 
on shareholder value” as well as a host of other issues.211 Guidance from 
the Trump DOL in 2018, however, explained that this earlier guidance 
“was not meant to imply that plan fiduciaries . . . should routinely incur 
significant plan expenses” to engage in advocacy on shareholder issues.212 
Despite the flexibility DOL guidance gives ERISA plan fiduciaries to 
consider ESG factors when they impact returns, to include ESG-themed 
choices in defined contribution plans, and to practice shareholder 
engagement when linked to value, ERISA fiduciaries understandably 
remain wary. The shifting tone of the Department’s pronouncements 
across administrations is unsettling. Moreover, the tremendous variation 
we find across similarly branded ESG investment products will stymie 
efforts to identify appropriate ESG investments for ERISA-regulated 
plans. Absent robust, standardized ESG disclosures, sophisticated 
intermediaries will struggle to identify the right ESG investment to match 
beneficiary preferences and fiduciary duties.  
The relatively high fees associated with ESG funds can further 
hamper retirement plan interest.213 Consider the plight of the CalSavers 
210 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2016-01 (2019). 
211 Id. 
212 Memorandum from John J. Canary, supra note 203. 
213 See Mark Miller, Bit by Bit, Socially Conscious Investors Are Influencing 401(k)’s, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/business/esg-401k-investing-
retirement.html [https://perma.cc/H4ZT-297X] (noting target-date funds’ importance to defined-
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program. The program is creating a new, publicly managed fund to 
provide California private sector workers with portable retirement 
savings. In an initial request for proposals, the program sought a suite of 
funds for retirement savers including an ESG option, but it was unable to 
find a sufficiently low-cost ESG option in this initial process.214  
In this environment, it is not surprising that uptake of ESG 
investments by private U.S. retirement plans has been limited. A 2018 
study found only “16% of [defined contribution] plans offer a dedicated 
ESG option. However, this number masks a large divide among plans: 
Only 5% of corporate DC plans offer a standalone option, compared to 
the 43% of public and non-profit plans that do so.”215 The numbers are 
increasing, but remain low. A 2019 study released by Callen, the same 
private ESG investment advisement firm, reports that thirty-six percent 
of defined contribution plans surveyed included an ESG fund in the 
lineup—the same percentage reported in BlackRock’s 2019 Institutional 
Investor Survey.216 The regulatory and market barriers to inclusion of 
ESG offerings in ERISA-regulated plans, together with the opacity and 
variation our study finds among funds themselves, still frustrate 
retirement savers seeking ESG alternatives.  
Signs suggest private pension plan ESG integration will increase. 
While only twelve percent of plan sponsors surveyed in 2018 reported 
incorporating ESG into selection of their fund managers, twenty-nine 
contribution plan offerings and that “there’s an expense hurdle stopping target date funds from 
becoming socially responsible funds”). 
 214 See Jon Hale, 3 Challenges for Getting ESG Funds into Retirement Plans, MEDIUM (Sept. 2, 
2018), https://medium.com/the-esg-advisor/3-challenges-for-getting-esg-funds-into-retirement-
plans-1ab62c1101ff [https://perma.cc/V8LA-M25E] (describing the CalSavers struggle); see also 
Arleen Jacobius, California Secure Choice Goes with Newton for CalSavers ESG Option, PENSION & 
INV. (Jan. 29, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20190129/ONLINE/190129852/
california-secure-choice-goes-with-newton-for-calsavers-esg-option [https://perma.cc/SG6W-
7UGC] (reporting CalSavers ultimately secured an ESG fund provider). 
 215 James Veneruso, Most DC Plans Don’t Feel ESG’s ‘Good Vibrations,’ CALLAN (May 29, 2018), 
https://www.callan.com/esg-dc [https://perma.cc/D67C-FPVL]. The frequent addition of a 
“brokerage window” option for 401(k) plan participants means that they theoretically could choose 
virtually any mutual fund or ETF on the market, along with a variety of other investment products. 
Utilization of this option, however, is extremely low for a variety of reasons. See Anne M. Tucker, 
Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage of Citizen Shareholders, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 163, 178 
(2015). 
 216  CALLEN INST., 2019 ESG SURVEY 18 (2019) (on file with authors); BLACKROCK, 2019 
BLACKROCK DC PULSE SURVEY 31 (2019) (on file with authors). 
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percent indicated interest in doing so in the future.217 Specialist Natixis 
Sustainable Future Funds has launched and widely publicized target-date 
ESG funds for inclusion in employer-sponsored plans.218 Reports in 2018 
suggested that Wells Fargo and BlackRock also had such vehicles under 
development, “betting that a surge in interest in environmental, social or 
governance investing will carry through to 401(k)s,”219 but those offerings 
have yet to come online as both firms continue an education-first 
approach.220 
The mix of economic and regulatory factors driving the uptake of 
ESG investing across different investor groups is unlikely to map perfectly 
to the variation across ESG investment products reported in our findings. 
Interest among individual investors is already significant and likely to 
grow, but how much and what kind of ESG these investors are willing to 
pay for remains unknown. Sovereign and public pension funds are major 
and enthusiastic ESG investors, with regulation poised to force even 
greater adoption as well as more uniform disclosure that may enable them 
to better navigate the variation across ESG investment products. Among 
other investor groups, uptake is more varied and uncertain. How well 
insurance companies and charitable endowments can discriminate 
among ESG offerings will determine how effective these recent converts 
will be at matching their preferences to available products—a process that 
would be aided by a more transparent ESG investment marketplace. The 
blend of regulatory uncertainty and high fees mean U.S. private pension 
plans are currently underrepresented in ESG investing. More clarity 
about the range of ESG commitments various products represent will 
 217 See BRAD SMITH & KELLY REGAN, NEPC ESG SURVEY: A PROFILE OF CORPORATE & 
HEALTHCARE PLAN DECISIONMAKERS’ PERSPECTIVES (2018), https://cdn2.hubspot.net/
hubfs/2529352/files/2018%2007%20NEPC%20ESG%20Survey%20Results%20.pdf?t=
1541714687871 [https://perma.cc/TG2P-7NB9]. 
 218 See Natixis Sustainable Future Funds, NATIXIS INV. MANAGERS, https://www.im.natixis.com/
us/natixis-sustainable-future-funds [https://perma.cc/2T3F-UNNX] (offering ten target-date 
alternative active ESG funds). 
 219 Melissa Karsh & Emily Chasan, BlackRock, Wells Fargo Are Betting on Ethical Investing 
Funds for 401(k)s, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-06-13/blackrock-wells-fargo-are-said-to-push-esg-funds-for-401-k-s 
[https://perma.cc/6XUF-YEQ4]. 
 220 See e.g., John Manganaro, Sponsors Can Expect Expanding ESG Opportunities, 
PLANSPONSOR (Apr. 16, 2019) (quoting Ron Cohen, Wells Fargo Asset Management’s head of 
defined contribution investment only (DCIO) sales); see also, BLACKROCK, supra note 216, at 29–
31. 
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likewise be required to unleash this still untapped potential. The final 
category of institutional investors—fund complexes themselves—are also 
key players in developing the ESG market. The next Part considers their 
complementary role as suppliers of ESG investment products. 
III. UNMASKING ESG SUPPLY SIDE DRIVERS
Diverse supply side forces also drive ESG asset growth and 
contribute to ESG market heterogeneity and opacity. For example, fund 
creators compete with each other on fund performance and fees, and each 
seeks to differentiate its offerings from those of its competitors in a 
crowded investment management market. Funds must also retain 
established clients and draw in new ones and design products that will 
generate revenue to support the fund complex’s bottom line.221 ESG 
investing presents opportunities for fund creators to serve their own 
interests in each of these ways and masking ESG product variation can 
often enhance these opportunities for generalist funds. Rising interest in 
ESG investing has also generated a huge market opportunity for the 
providers of ESG indices and metrics, who are likewise capitalizing on 
this key moment. This Part considers how fund creators’ and index 
providers’ responses to these pressures and opportunities are 
contributing to the development of ESG investing.  
Supply side market forces are largely unbridled because investment 
law has little to say about the substance of ESG investing.222 A 
combination of investor “control” over investment allocations and 
intermediated fiduciary duties through employer plan sponsorships 
leaves investment products and retirement investors in a largely 
 221 Vanguard would argue its unique structure differentiates it from its competitors on this 
score. See Why Ownership Matters, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/what-sets-vanguard-
apart/why-ownership-matters/#targetText=Our%20unique%20client%2Downed%20structure,%
22mutual%22%20mutual%20fund%20company [https://perma.cc/8JU4-3TYU]. It remains, 
however, a company focused on remaining a significant and profitable market player. 
 222 At the portfolio company level, too, law plays a minor role. Corporate statues are generally 
silent as to corporate objectives and whether and to what extent corporate fiduciaries should 
consider sustainability and other social concerns is rarely litigated. See Dana Brakman Reiser, 
Progress Is Possible: Sustainability in US Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY 
131, 134–37 (Beate Sjåfjell & Christopher M. Bruner eds., 2019). 
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unregulated space, save for the standard financial disclosures required 
and claims facilitated by SEC regulations.223 Fund compliance officers 
likely disagree when peering from under the web of regulation, but from 
a consumer standpoint investment products are a low-regulatory 
environment where market forces dominate. Index providers operate 
completely outside of regulation, offering private products answerable to 
no one.224 When developing ESG investment products, fund complexes 
and index providers in this low-regulation environment respond to the 
financial incentives that motivate them: increasing market share (and 
AUM for fund complexes) and earning fees.  
As the evidence shifts to accept that ESG factors influence financial 
returns, fund families’ business models are implicated directly. If funds 
perform better financially when investments excel on ESG factors, fund 
complexes can boost AUM and expand market share by outperforming 
competitors on ESG integration. To seize this opportunity, funds will 
develop active funds that consider ESG as they select investments and 
implement the methods of ESG investing that best align with financial 
return. In their passive fund portfolios, fund creators will pursue ESG 
indices and other metrics that likewise align with financial performance. 
While ESG engagement strategies might help active and passive funds 
alike to mitigate risk, passive funds’ relative lock-in to the firms within a 
given index increase the importance of engagement for this market 
segment.  
BlackRock, the largest U.S. investment company, signals the 
growing link (or at least messaging) between ESG factors and financial 
return. BlackRock, typifying a shifting market ethos, has reimagined itself 
as a force for good.225 In recent years, the mutual fund giant has 
committed to increased ESG investing. Perhaps most prominently, 
BlackRock Chairman and CEO Larry Fink expressed concern in his 2018 
letter to CEOs of its investee companies that  
 223 As one author has written about separately, federal regulation of retirement plans is 
piecemeal and trifurcated between the DOL, Internal Revenue Service, and SEC leaving everyone, 
and no one, driving retirement plans the way beneficiaries may assume. See Tucker, supra note 206, 
at 215–18 (discussing the oversight and structural limitations of ERISA regulations). 
 224 See Market Indices, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersindiceshtm.html 
[https://perma.cc/FEG3-BRV3] (explaining that “[t]he SEC does not regulate the content of these 
indices” used to compose indexed mutual funds and ETFs). 
225 BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate#intro [https://perma.cc/83VH-S4XH]. 
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[t]o prosper over time, every company must not only deliver
financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive
contribution to society. Companies must benefit all of their
stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers,
and the communities in which they operate.226
Fink pledged BlackRock would use its considerable clout with portfolio 
companies to demand long-term growth strategies that take sustainability 
issues into account, at least as they contribute to growth and profitability. 
Despite mixed responses to the 2018 letter, the following two years’ 
missives doubled down on the ESG theme. Fink asserted that “profits and 
purpose are inextricably linked,”227 “sustainable investing is the strongest 
foundation for client portfolios,” and “purpose is the engine of long-term 
profitability.”228  
Corporate leaders, too, are signaling their support. The Business 
Roundtable, the preeminent U.S. association of large corporations,229 
released a statement in the summer of 2019 backing away from the 
shareholder primacy perspective it had long espoused. Instead, it 
announced that companies “share a fundamental commitment to all of 
our stakeholders,” including customers, employees, and suppliers, as well 
as shareholders, and a commitment “to deliver value to all of them, for 
the future success of our companies, our communities and our 
country.”230 Earnings calls by individual companies increasingly address 
ESG issues as well.231 Even the Financial Times joined the chorus, with an 
 226 Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Blackrock, to CEOs (Jan. 12, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/16/business/dealbook/document-BlackRock-s-
Laurence-Fink-Urges-C-E-O-s-to-Focus.html?dlbk [https://perma.cc/VF34-FL5V]. 
 227 Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, BlackRock, to CEOs (Jan. 16, 2019) 
[hereinafter 2019 Letter from Larry Fink], https://www.blackrock.com/americas-offshore/2019-
larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/Z7MG-DKYB]. 
228 Letter from Larry Fink, supra note 10. 
 229 See About Us, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, https://www.businessroundtable.org/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/8FD2-6V5S]. 
230 Our Commitment, supra note 11. 
231 See Karen Langley, More Companies Are Making Noise About ESG, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 
2019, 2:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-companies-are-making-noise-about-esg-
11569263634 [perma.cc/T969-LVGT] (reporting “[t]wenty-four companies in the S&P 500 
mentioned the acronym ‘ESG’ on earnings conference calls between June 15 and Sept. 14, double 
the number . . . in the first quarter” and an enormous jump from two years earlier when only two 
had done so). 
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opinion from its editorial board arguing “retail savers and the investment 
industry should embrace a corporate perspective that looks beyond the 
narrow bottom line to take into account companies’ impact on climate 
and environment, workers and the communities they operate in” as a way 
to enhance corporate value over the long term.232  
These developments are also propelled by the swelling importance 
of millennials as employees, consumers, and investors. For example, 
Fink’s 2019 letter explained, “[a]s wealth shifts and investing preferences 
change, environmental, social, and governance issues will be increasingly 
material to corporate valuations.”233 Not all fund complexes will climb 
out as far on the ESG limb as BlackRock claims to be going, but 
generational shifts will impact them all. If Fink’s predictions are borne 
out, other fund complexes—whether in or outside of the public eye—will 
need to ramp up their reputation for responding to ESG issues to keep 
their funds’ returns competitive and appeal to the investors of the future. 
Scholars Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis, and David H. Webber have 
forcefully argued this shift is already occurring.234 Fielding ESG 
investments, no matter where they fall on the spectra of cost and impact, 
will help build reputational capital235 with this increasingly important 
demographic.  
ESG funds offer fund complexes benefits beyond the assets invested 
in ESG funds themselves. Consider retirement plan administrators 
creating the highly curated investment menu (in the ballpark of twenty 
 232 Editorial Board, Investors Should Look Beyond the Bottom Line, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/30b3b8d2-f014-11e9-ad1e-4367d8281195 [https://perma.cc/B4QK-
DVNP]. 
 233 2019 Letter from Larry Fink, supra note 227; see also Langley, supra note 231 (identifying 
“[o]ne contributing factor [as] a transfer of wealth to members of the millennial generation, who as 
a group are more focused on sustainability”). 
 234 See Michal Barzuza et al., Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund Activism and the New Millennial 
Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 47–53), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439516 [https://perma.cc/GMG9-VZZQ] (arguing index funds 
significant engagement and voting activity on matters of social activism can be explained by their 
desire to compete for the current and future investment business of the millennial generation). 
235 Cf. Claire A. Hill, Marshalling Reputation to Minimize Problematic Business Conduct, 99 B.U. 
L. REV. 1193, 1213 (2019) (arguing that business reputation—both in avoiding “reputational risk
events” and in creating a generally positive image among consumers, regulators, and others—aligns 
with profitability). 
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funds)236 for participants to allocate their retirement savings. Including 
ESG funds in a fund family facilitates direct investment opportunities in 
those funds, but it may also garner goodwill about the fund family, 
facilitating investment in traditional products carried by a fund with both 
ESG and traditional offerings.  
Thereby, advertising for ESG-related vehicles can be used to 
influence fund flows to a fund family’s ESG and non-ESG products alike. 
For example, in 2018, coinciding with the largest fund flow to passive 
funds ever at the time, TIAA-CREF launched a new advertising campaign 
for Nuveen, the firm’s ESG investing arm. The campaign was titled 
“investing by example” and included video content for Internet and 
television, and nationwide billboard and print advertising.237 The 
campaign focused on the positive ripple effect of investments with the 
line, “When we invest in a world we’re proud to leave behind, it isn’t just 
business as usual. It’s investing by example.”238 The campaign contained 
intentional features to reach baby boomers as well as young investors; for 
example, it used a band popular with millennials to play a cover of the 
1970s band the Carpenters. The ads also harkened back to TIAA-CREF’s 
founder, Andrew Carnegie, and linked the legacy investment arm with 
the new ESG practice.239 
Critically, ESG investing also provides fund complexes with a 
welcome counterbalance to the passive investing trend and its negative 
effect on fees. Fund complexes rely for revenues in large part on the 
higher fees paid for active fund investments.240 As data emerged showing 
passive funds consistently outperforming their active counterparts, 
particularly when returns are considered net of fees, fund flows to passive 
strategies increased, and active managers have come under pressure to 
 236 See, e.g., Janice Kay McClendon, The Death Knell of Traditional Defined Benefit Plans: 
Avoiding a Race to the 401(k) Bottom, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 809, 831 (2007) (citing an average of 
eighteen choices in a defined contribution plan menu). 
 237 MullenLowe, Nuveen—Investing by Example, DRUM (Sept. 2018), 
https://www.thedrum.com/creative-works/project/mullenlowe-nuveen-investing-example 
[https://perma.cc/RH94-QA2A]. 
 238 @NuveenInv, TWITTER (Sept. 20, 2018, 11:01 AM), https://twitter.com/NuveenInv/status/
1042790840287027201 [https://perma.cc/HF5D-XWVT]. 
239 MullenLowe, supra note 237.  
 240 See Fisch et al., supra note 47, at 36–37 (reporting that even passive fund specialists like 
Vanguard field numerous active funds). 
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reduce fees or justify them in some way.241 The costs and challenges of 
ESG investment can be used to support active management strategies and 
to justify higher fees in actively and passively managed funds alike.  
After all, even funds marketed as ESG index products often include 
some active elements like screening—and associated higher fees.242 
Relatively higher-fee ESG offerings can thus offset lower fees earned on 
ordinary indexed assets and fund flow favoring passive strategies.243 In 
this way, ESG investment products can also strategically respond to the 
existential threat fund complexes face from the rise of passive investing.  
The growing pool of investors demanding alignment of their 
investments with their values may accept that strong ESG investment 
performance justifies higher fees. As suggested by the variation of ESG 
commitment our study reports, it will be difficult and costly for high-ESG 
investors to determine which ESG investment products provide the best 
match for their preferences. Without more transparent and consistent 
information about how funds live up to their ESG label, individual and 
institutional investors will be unable to investigate the matter thoroughly 
and act accordingly.  
When obscured, ESG variation also invites a broader market harm 
that combines greenwashing and free-riding.244 High ESG funds may be 
fueling sector development in green energy or clean water, generating 
anecdotal evidence of high ESG impact. The anecdotes and goodwill of 
such highly committed ESG funds can spill over to less committed ESG 
funds when investors cannot differentiate between their claims of ESG 
effort or impact. For example, consider the Vanguard FTSE Social Index, 
a fund in our ESGP sample that voted against every ESG proposal we 
 241 See Charles Stein et al., Free Fidelity Funds Stoke Price War in Bid to Catch Index Giants, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2018, 11:08 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-01/
fidelity-to-offer-index-mutual-funds-with-zero-expense-ratio (describing how all of the major 
mutual fund and ETF providers are engaged in fee reduction to capture investors seeking low-price 
options). 
242 See, e.g., Praxis Growth Index Fund A, supra note 155. 
 243 See MORNINGSTAR, supra note 3, at 27–28 (positing that fund creators repurposing actively 
managed funds experiencing outflows “would not be surprising”). Future work could examine the 
relationship between fund flows out of actively managed funds and the rise of ESG funds. 
244  Greenwashing is when companies, or here, investment firms, mislead consumers (investors) 
about the social or environmental benefits of their products or services. For a discussion of 
greenwashing, see Magali A. Delmas & Vanessa Cuerel Burbano, The Drivers of Greenwashing, 54 
CAL. MGMT. REV. 64 (2011). 
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tracked between 2018–2019 and which held exclusively household name 
brand companies in its top ten holdings for both years (including Wells 
Fargo, JP Morgan, Citigroup, Mastercard, and Visa). Vanguard ESG 
marketing boasts its ESG investment options are funds “[w]here your 
money can reflect what matters to you.”245 Absent market discipline 
provided by clear signals to high ESG-committed investors to invest in 
high-ESG funds, low-ESG funds have little incentive to increase their own 
ESG. Further, high-ESG funds subsidize the ESG brand while potentially 
losing committed ESG capital.  
The variation we find across ESG investment products is also driven 
in part by the firms providing ESG metrics, benchmarking ESG 
performance, and, most importantly, designing ESG indices. As noted 
above, intermediaries that produce and sell these opaque systems, like 
MSCI and FTSE Russell, play an outsized role in ESG indexed equity 
funds.246 By at least one measure, metric and index providers also appear 
to be pursuing widely disparate visions or applications of ESG. A 2018 
study by Schroders found a remarkable “lack of consistency in ESG scores 
between the main data providers.”247 An Economist study of two major 
ESG rating firms found “ESG scores are poorly correlated with each 
other.”248 This variation makes sense in a growing industry, in which each 
player is seeking to gain market share and justify its fees to potential fund 
complex customers. 
Beyond their contribution to the variation our study finds, it is 
important to note the tremendous influence index and other ESG metric 
providers wield over how institutional investors will prioritize and 
operationalize ESG factors. They quite literally are setting the standards 
for what counts as ESG. By dint of their power in the investment 
 245 ESG Investing: Where Your Money Can Reflect What Matters to You, VANGUARD, 
https://investor.vanguard.com/investing/esg [https://perma.cc/73Z4-SP3F]. 
 246 See supra text accompanying notes 89–92. New players are also hurtling into the ESG metric 
field. See Billy Nauman, Credit Rating Agencies Join Battle for ESG Supremacy, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 16, 
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/59f60306-d671-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77 [https://perma.cc/
GAH8-59YL] (describing “Moody’s and S&P Global, two of the big three credit rating agencies” as 
“elbowing their way in, offering separate ESG scores on companies in addition to their traditional 
assessments of creditworthiness”). 
 247 See Ovidiu Patrascu, Index-Based ESG Strategies: Key Things to Watch for, SCHRODERS (Aug. 
10, 2018), https://www.schroders.com/en/us/institutional/thought-leadership/sustainability/
index-based-esg-strategies-key-things-to-watch-for [https://perma.cc/67QZ-8HPT]. 
248 ESG Investing: Poor Scores, ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 2019, at 67. 
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marketplace, these very private players also will impact the ESG goals to 
which portfolio companies will aspire. To appease their clients and 
maintain their market dominance, index and metric providers will 
naturally seek to identify new, different, value-added ways to measure or 
index for ESG factors that contribute to financial performance, but these 
may or may not align with either investor preferences or societal needs in 
these areas. The private nature of the indices means neither investors nor 
the rest of us will likely ever know. 
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESPONSES
Over the last decade, enormous amounts of money have flown into 
ESG and now ESG index funds, driven by a combination of demand-side 
and supply-side forces. Whether motivated by their individual values, 
legal requirements, or a vision of ESG factors driving financial return, 
investors are seeking products that respond to systemic risk, climate 
change, and social inequality whether in name or practice. Fund creators’ 
relentless pursuit of tools to better predict financial return, as well as their 
desire to increase market share and enhance revenues in an industry 
rocked by the rise of passive investing, are leading them to supply a 
dizzying array of ESG products. Passive EGS products in turn are 
increasingly linked to opaque and unaccountable specialty indices. In 
ESG investing’s low-regulation environment, these market forces are 
largely unchecked.  
The variety and opacity of ESG funds leaves even a diligent and well-
intentioned investor without assurance that an ESG investment, and even 
more so one in an ESG index fund, will match her preferences. It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to comprehensively consider the market-
based and regulatory strategies for improving ESG products’ ability to 
satisfy investor expectations and harness the investment market to 
improve environmental and social sustainability. In this Part, however, 
we briefly sketch some promising alternatives and identify areas for 
exploration in future research.  
The market, already the most powerful force in this low-regulation 
space, is one promising place to seek improvement in ESG investing. If 
investors, both individual and institutional, demand more clarity about 
ESG practices and commitments, fund creators can be expected to 
respond. On the individual side, we can expect the growing financial 
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weight of women and millennials to continue to increase demand for 
more and better ESG investing performance over branding. Like all 
individual investors, though, they face coordination problems and 
information deficits. Therefore, intermediary behavior will be key. Expert 
investment intermediaries can demand greater clarity and assessment 
from fund creators, especially if the potential of ERISA markets can be 
tapped. On the institutional side, a combination of business goals and 
legal dictates will also increase demands for reliable and transparent ESG 
investment products. Sustained evidence linking ESG investing to 
financial performance will intensify institutional investors’ demands for 
real and accountable ESG integration. Disclosure requirements in the EU 
are already driving ESG innovation and transparency. If this major 
market mandates its largest players to integrate ESG, it will in turn push 
fund creators worldwide to offer complying and transparent products.  
The impact of regulation already being felt in Europe is just one 
example of how legal intervention can play a positive role in improving 
ESG investing’s ability to deliver across the range of ESG investor 
preferences. It seems far-fetched to imagine U.S. regulators imposing 
ESG integration mandates.249 Disclosure requirements on companies and 
funds, however, could be updated to include information on ESG 
factors.250 Much of the discussion around ESG or sustainability disclosure 
in the United States has revolved around issuer (as opposed to fund) 
obligations.251 Currently, securities regulation imposes no broad-based 
249 Bills to this effect have been introduced in Congress but have not progressed very far. See, 
e.g., ESG Disclosure Simplification Act of 2019, H.R. 4329, 116th Cong. (2020) (mandatory ESG
reporting legislation introduced in the House). 
250 Consumer facing financial disclosure is a favored regulatory intervention, but one with 
haunting criticisms around investors’ use. Homer Kripe vehemently made this case with the 
“hypothesis . . . that the prospectus is intended for the man in the street, the unsophisticated lay 
investor . . . is a myth . . . [and] largely responsible for the fact that the securities prospectus is fairly 
close to worthless.” Homer Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 BUS. LAW. 631, 632 
(1973); see also Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 466–68 (2015) (defining 
reasonable investors); Charles R. Korsmo, The Audience for Corporate Disclosure, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
1581, 1586–87 (2017) (introducing a taxonomy of securities disclosure audiences). Our disclosure 
suggestion rests upon assumptions of a sophisticated intermediary such as analysts or retirement 
professionals to distill and disseminate disclosure contents to investing consumers. 
251 See, e.g., Ann M. Lipton, Mixed Company: The Audience for Sustainability Disclosures, 107 
GEO. L.J. ONLINE 81 (2018) (arguing issuer disclosures should more broadly address sustainability); 
Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923,  952–56 (2019) 
(advocating a new mandatory sustainability discussion and analysis section of issuers’ annual 
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requirement for companies to engage in such disclosures,252 although 
companies frequently issue voluntary disclosures styled as corporate 
responsibility or sustainability reports.253 Organizations like the Global 
Reporting Initiative254 and Sustainability Accounting Standards Board255 
offer tools to standardize this voluntary reporting, but at the moment 
voluntary company reports remain diverse and often difficult to 
compare.256 The conversation about issuer disclosure is important, but 
resolving it will not necessarily provide fund investors with sufficient 
information. When they invest in funds combining scores of individual 
issuers, disclosures around the ESG practices of a fund or its associated 
index would be far more informative.257 The European experience can 
help U.S. regulators distill the focus and content of any disclosure 
disclosures); Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform—The SEC Is Riding off in Two Directions at 
Once, 71 BUS. LAW. 781 (2016); see also Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation 
S-K Release No. 33-10064, at 206-15 (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2016/33-
10064.pdf [https://perma.cc/YUQ8-UAGS] (requesting comments on whether the SEC should
mandate sustainability disclosure by issuers). 
252 For the SEC’s most recent efforts at more targeted ESG disclosure, see Modernization of 
Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105 Release Nos. 33-10668, 34-86614, at 48 (August 8, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2019/33-10668.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SA4-N7VD] 
(proposing to replace a reporting obligation to merely state its number of employees with “a 
description of the registrant’s human capital resources, including . . . human capital measures or 
objectives that management focuses on in managing the business”); see also Fisch, supra note 251, 
at 947–52 (describing the lack of SEC mandates in this area, with discussion of limited disclosure 
obligations it has imposed around climate change and board diversity). 
253 See KPMG, THE ROAD AHEAD: THE KPMG SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
REPORTING 2017, at 4 (2017), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2017/10/kpmg-
survey-of-corporate-responsibility-reporting-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/736M-KJQJ] (finding 
“CR reporting is standard practice for large and mid-cap companies around the world” with three-
quarters of companies surveyed engaging in the practice). 
254 See About GRI, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting.org/
information/about-gri/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/WH28-CR7J]. 
255 See Standards Overview, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, https://www.sasb.org/
standards-overview [https://perma.cc/4VH2-KQVU]. 
256 See Fisch, supra note 251, at 944–46; Jill M. D’Aquila, The Current State of Sustainability 
Reporting: A Work in Progress, CPA J. (July 2018), https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/07/30/the-
current-state-of-sustainability-reporting [https://perma.cc/9ZV7-P5EX]. 
257 Cf. STEPHEN DAVIS ET AL., WHAT THEY DO WITH YOUR MONEY: HOW THE FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM FAILS US AND HOW TO FIX IT 139–41 (2016) (addressing the need to regulate investment 
intermediaries); see also Doug Chia, Big ESG, SOUNDBOARD GOVERNANCE (Nov. 11, 2019), 
https://www.soundboardgovernance.com/post/big-esg [https://perma.cc/ZKT5-88EU] (arguing 
that company ESG disclosure rewards volume over quality). 
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mandates it might impose on investment companies, and future work in 
this area is warranted.  
Another legal intervention to increase the transparency and 
effectiveness of ESG investing would take advantage of a different set of 
investment market actors: private employers and their retirement plan 
administrators. As discussed above, operating in the shadow of often dire 
DOL warnings about non-financial investment considerations, these 
ERISA fiduciaries currently make relatively little use of ESG investment 
products. This barrier should be removed or reframed to seize upon 
growing links between ESG performance and financial performance, 
particularly over the long-term, and its consequent compatibility with 
retirement savings goals. In doing so, however, the DOL should prod 
ERISA fiduciaries to become demanding consumers of ESG products, 
requiring transparent and consistent disclosures of ESG strategies, and 
their impact on fees, diversification, and tracking error. Fund creators not 
wanting to miss out on the enormous ERISA-regulated asset market 
would have significant incentives to respond.  
Regulating index providers is yet another route to improving the 
content, consistency, and transparency of ESG investment products. By 
creating the metrics that fuel ESG investing, these thoroughly private 
players wield great public power over markets—and more. One need only 
look to the role of the rating agencies in the 2008 financial crisis to be 
reminded of the tremendous impact seemingly unassuming metric 
providers can produce.  
European regulation has again been at the forefront here, with its 
European Benchmark Regulation in force since January 2018. This 
Regulation creates “a common framework to ensure the accuracy and 
integrity of indices used as benchmarks in financial instruments and 
financial contracts, or to measure the performance of investment funds 
in the Union.”258 It was prompted by scandals like LIBOR259 and concerns 
 258 See Regulation (EU) 2016/1011, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2016 on Indices Used as Benchmarks in Financial Instruments and Financial Contracts or to 
Measure the Performance of Investment Funds, 2016 O.J. (L 171) 1, art. I, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.171.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=
OJ:L:2016:171:TOC [https://perma.cc/3PQN-LCK4]. 
 259 See id. (noting in the preamble at (1) that “[s]erious cases of manipulation of interest rate 
benchmarks such as LIBOR and EURIBOR, as well as allegations that energy, oil and foreign 
exchange benchmarks have been manipulated, demonstrate that benchmarks can be subject to 
conflicts of interest”). 
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about the growing influence and concentration of index providers in the 
passive investing space more generally, and not with ESG indices in mind. 
Its authority sweeps broadly, however. Whether it will be effective in 
constraining index providers, and in what ways, will depend on how it is 
implemented. But index providers seeking to operate in the EU market 
(read: virtually all of them and certainly all of the big ones) are watching. 
The topic of index regulation looms large on the U.S. regulatory 
horizon as well. The massive shift of investment assets under 
management to passive strategies empowers private index providers. 
They are generating huge profits and the market is consolidating.260 The 
longstanding view that index providers are mere publishers, not subject 
to regulation as investment advisors,261 is ripe for revision. The ESG 
context, where index providers devise bespoke indices, sometimes for use 
by a single fund, is an example of the declining utility of the publisher 
analogy. Review of the idea that a fund’s disclosure that it uses a particular 
index is sufficient without greater elaboration is likewise overdue. The 
SEC’s recent proposed regulations on ETFs failed to address index 
regulation, but this effort certainly drew its attention to the explosive 
growth and power of index providers.262 If and when the SEC sets its 
 260 See Naumann, supra note 246 (describing the large and growing market for ESG ratings); 
Dieter Holger, ESG Investing Trend Has Powered Index Giant MSCI to Market Outperformance in 
2019, MARKETWATCH (Sep. 12, 2019, 3:43 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/esg-
investing-trend-has-powered-index-giant-msci-to-market-outperformance-in-2019-2019-09-12 
[perma.cc/7G7M-YRNC]. 
 261 The Investment Advisors Act exempts publishers “of any bona fide newspaper, news 
magazine or business or financial publication of general and regular circulation” from its regulatory 
purview, 15 USC § 80b-2(a)(11)(D) (2018), and the U.S. Supreme Court opined that the exemption 
warranted a “broad reading,” Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 183, 204–05 (1985). Index providers rely 
on their position providing general, rather than client-centered, evaluation and advice to avoid 
regulation. See Rachel Evans, A $3.6 Trillion Regulatory Hole Around ETFs Gets SEC Scrutiny, 
BLOOMBERG (July 18, 2018, 10:51 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-18/a-
3-trillion-regulatory-hole-surrounding-etfs-gets-sec-scrutiny [https://perma.cc/DNH6-CH9H].
262 See Exchange Traded Funds Release Nos. 33-10515, IC-33140, at 11 (June 28, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2018/33-10515.pdf [https://perma.cc/589S-YXVS] 
(discussing ETFs’ reliance not only on “broad-based” but also “specialized,” “customized or 
bespoke indexes”); see also Dalia Blass, Dir., SEC Division Inv. Mgmt., Keynote Address, ICI 2018 
Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference (March 19, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-blass-2018-03-19 [https://perma.cc/T8SK-A3KY] 
(suggesting, in a speech “only for myself and not for the Commission, the Commissioners or the 
staff,” that innovation in the index market may mean it is time to “revisit” these regulatory issues). 
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sights on index regulation, the particular challenge of making ESG indices 
transparent and accountable must be part of the conversation.  
CONCLUSION 
The promise of ESG investing in general, and passive ESG in 
particular, is enormous: guilt-free and lower-cost retirement savings for 
the conscientious consumer investor. Despite its astounding recent 
growth in AUM and the widely publicized embrace of stakeholderism 
from so many quarters across the business community, investors will 
have difficulty identifying products to match their ESG preferences. The 
offerings in this essentially unregulated market are endlessly varied and 
its use of ESG factors is opaque. ESG investment strategies are difficult to 
parse and nearly impossible to compare. Portfolio holdings and fund 
voting records vary widely in how much they differ from non-ESG 
alternatives. Investigating any of these differences across the field of funds 
is a monumental task. One possible way to sort the range of ESG 
investment products is between lower-fee generalist ESG funds and 
higher-fee specialty ESG funds with a thematic investment focus such as 
clean water. Specialty ESG funds, while expensive, offer the most ESG-
distinctive strategies, holdings, and voting patterns in our case study, 
suggesting that perhaps investors get the ESG that they pay for.  
With only such rough guidance, gaining traction on the difficult 
matching problem in the massively expanding pool of new (or rebranded) 
ESG investment products will require more than passionate declarations 
of purpose by industry leaders. At present—at least in the United States—
the ESG aspects of these products are unregulated. Fund creators and 
index providers are pursuing their own interests in increasing revenues 
and market share by cultivating a market in which ESG functions as 
branding to signal a normatively “good” fund. In reality, the investment 
landscape is highly variable in terms of ESG differentiation and those 
variations are not facially obvious. As demand for ESG investment 
products increases across a range of investors and geographies, investors 
may propel fund creators and index providers to improve ESG 
distinctiveness and transparency. Market forces alone, though, are 
unlikely to correct the incentives for opacity and variation that risk 
widespread mismatching. In contrast, changes to securities disclosure 
mandates, ERISA law, and index regulation could hasten improvements.  
2020] BUYER BEWARE 2005 
Solving the ESG investor matching puzzle is critical and could do 
great good, but the power of business to tackle environmental social 
problems should not be oversold. Market players in ESG investing can be 
expected to continue to act in their own self-interest, even if pressure for 
consistency and transparency from customers or regulators increases. 
When this self-interest aligns with the interests of society—and especially 
when environmental and social responsibility aligns with financial 
return—the rest of us can free ride. But nobody should expect a complete 
overlap. Even if consistency and transparency in ESG investing improves, 
additional efforts by governments, the private sector, and countless 
individual actors are necessary to make real progress on many systemic 
challenges facing global society today.  
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APPENDIX I 
Sample Funds 
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APPENDIX II 
Top 10 Portfolio Holdings of Sample Funds (2018) 
*High household name brand recognition denoted by HNB
ESGP SAMPLE (n= 14 ) 
Vanguard FTSE Social Index Inv.  HNB 
Wells Fargo & Co Cisco Systems Inc Mastercard Inc A 
Procter & Gamble Co The Home Depot Inc Walt Disney Co 
Intel Corp Merck & Co Inc Citigroup Inc 
PepsiCo Inc 
Calvert US Large Cap Core Rspn Idx I  HNB 
Apple Inc Amazon. com Inc Visa Inc Class A 
Alphabet Inc A JPMorgan Chase & 
Co 
AT&T Inc 




iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETFHNB 
Microsoft Corp Alphabet Inc A Intel Corp 
Facebook Inc A Verizon Comm. Inc Procter & Gamble 
Co 
Alphabet Inc Class C Cisco Systems Inc Merck & Co Inc 
Coca-Cola Co 
PowerShares Water Resources ETF 
Waters Corp Xylem Inc/NY IDEX Corp 




Pentair PLC AO Smith Corp 
Rexnord Corp 
PAX MSCI EAFE ESG Leaders Index Instl  HNB 
Roche Holding AG 
Dividend Right Cert. 
ROG 
Commonwealth Bank 





Basf SE BAS Siemens AG SIE 
SAP SE SAP Novo Nordisk A/S 
B NOVO B 
Allianz SE ALV 
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iShares MSCI USA ESG Select ETFHNB 
Microsoft 3M Blackrock 
EcoLab Inc Accenture Agilent Tech. Inc.  
Apple Inc Alphabet Northern Trust Cor. 
Prologis REIT Inc.  
Guggenheim S&P Global Water ETF 
Xylem Inc/NY Geberit AG Tetra Tech Inc 
Danaher Corp Pentair PLC Coway Co Ltd 
IDEX Corp Alfa Laval AB Aalberts Industries 
NV 
ANDRITZ AG 
iShares MSCI ACWI Low Carbon Target ETF 
Apple Inc.  Johnson & Johnson JP Morgan 
Microsoft Facebook Alphabet Inc. 
Amazon com Inc Alphabet Inc. Class A Pfizer Inc 
Bank of America 
Corp. 
Calvert Global Water A 
American Water 









Pennon Group PLC 
Veolia 
Environnement SA 
Cia de Saneamento 
do Parana 
Beijing Enterprises 
Water Group Ltd 
American States 
Water Co 
Guggenheim Solar ETF 









Capital Inc HASI 
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Green Century MSCI International Index Fund - Institution 
Kao Corp.  Nintendo Co. Ltd.  RELX PLC 
Intesa Sanpaolo S. p. 
A.  
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Arg. S. A.  
Schneider Electric 
SE 
Kering KDDI Corp.  
Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Comm.  Adidas AG 
Praxis Growth Index Fund A  HNB 
Apple Inc Alphabet Inc Class C UnitedHealth 
Group Inc 
Microsoft Corp Facebook Inc A The Home Depot 
Inc  
Amazon. com Inc Visa Inc Class A Alphabet Inc A  
Mastercard Inc A 
Praxis International Index A 
Nestle SA Toyota Motor Corp HSBC Holdings 
PLC  
Tencent Holdings Ltd Equinor ASA Alibaba Group 
Holding Ltd  
Taiwan 
Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Co Ltd 
Roche Holding AG Chunghwa Telecom 
Co Ltd  
AstraZeneca PLC 
Praxis Value Index AHNB 
Apple Inc UnitedHealth Group 
Inc 
Walmart Inc 
JPMorgan Chase & 
Co 
AT&T Inc Citigroup Inc 
Bank of America 
Corp. 
Johnson & Johnson DowDuPont Inc 
Procter & Gamble 
Co 
Walmart Inc 
ESG Fund sample (n=17) 
Parnassus Core Equity Investor  HNB 
Xylem Inc VF Corp Sysco Corp 
WD-40 Co Verisk Analytics Inc Synopsys Inc 
2010 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1921 
Waste Management 
Inc 
United Parcel Service 
Inc Class B Starbucks Corp 
Walt Disney Co 





Finance Corp Ltd 
Sberbank of Russia 
PJSC 
Alibaba Group 
Holding Ltd ADR 
Samsung Electronics 
Co Ltd HDFC Bank Ltd 
AIA Group Ltd 
Ping An Insurance 
(Group) Co. of 





Parnassus Endeavor Investor  HNB 
Qualcomm Inc 
Micron Technology 
Inc Allergan PLC 
Mattel Inc 
United Parcel Service 
Inc Class B 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Company 
CVS Health Corp 
Alliance Data 
Systems Corp Hanesbrands Inc 
Gilead Sciences Inc 
TIAA-CREF Social Choice Eq Instl  HNB 
Apple Inc 
Procter & Gamble 
Co Merck & Co Inc 
Microsoft Corp Cisco Systems Inc Coca-Cola Co 
Bank of America 
Corporation Intel Corp PepsiCo Inc 
The Home Depot Inc 
Calvert Equity A  HNB 
Thermo Fisher 
Scientific Inc Microsoft Corp Zoetis Inc Class A 
Danaher Corp Praxair Inc Mastercard Inc A 
Alphabet Inc Class C Dollar General Corp Intuit Inc 
Visa Inc Class A 
2020] BUYER BEWARE 2011 
Amana Growth Investor  HNB 
Adobe Systems Inc Cisco Systems Inc Alphabet Inc A 
Apple Inc Amgen Inc 
The Estee Lauder 
Companies Inc Class 
A 
Intuit Inc 
Church & Dwight Co 
Inc Harris Corp 
TJX Companies Inc 




Bank Corp H 
China Petroleum & 
Chemical Corp H 
Shares 
Samsung Electronics 
Co Ltd PJSC Lukoil ADR AIA Group Ltd 
Alibaba Group 
Holding Ltd  
Sberbank of Russia 







Inc Hologic Inc Clorox Co 
Fiserv Inc Teleflex Inc Iron Mountain Inc 





Neuberger Berman Socially Rspns Inv  HNB 
Progressive Corp Aptiv PLC 
Intercontinental 
Exchange Inc 
Comcast Corp Class 




and Co Alphabet Inc A 
Advance Auto Parts 
Inc 
2012 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1921 
Eventide Gilead 
XPO Logistics Inc Splunk Inc 
Macquarie 
Infrastructure Corp 
Wayfair Inc Class A HubSpot Inc Instructure Inc 
Ascendis Pharma 
A/S ADR 
Palo Alto Networks 
Inc Lam Research Corp 
Lowe’s Companies 
Inc 
Domini Impact International Equity Inv 
Sanofi SA Kering SA Novartis AG 




Railway Co Sandvik AB AXA SA 
Vodafone Group 
PLC 
Amana Income Investor HNB 





Microsoft Corp Pfizer Inc DowDuPont Inc 
3M Co 
Honeywell Internat’l 
Inc PPG Industries Inc 
Rockwell 
Automation Inc 
AB Sustainable Global Thematic A 





Inc Kingspan Group PLC 
Hexcel Corp Ecolab Inc 
American Water 
Works Co Inc 
Housing 
Development 
Finance Corp Ltd 
RBC Emerging Markets Equity I 
Naspers Ltd Class N AIA Group Ltd Credicorp Ltd 
Housing 
Development 
Finance Corp Ltd Unilever PLC SM Investments Corp 
2020] BUYER BEWARE 2013 
Tata Consultancy 
Services Ltd Antofagasta PLC 
Shinhan Financial 





Calvert Emerging Markets Equity I 
Wal – Mart de 
Mexico SAB de CV 
Class V 
Techtronic 


















Morgan Stanley Inst Global Opp IHNB 
Amazon.com Inc DSV A/S Moncler SpA 
Mastercard Inc A 
TAL Education 
Group ADR Visa Inc Class A 





Pax Global Environmental Mrkts Instl 
Sealed Air Corp Suez SA Ferguson PLC 
Siemens AG Danaher Corp Praxair Inc 
East Japan Railway 
Co Ecolab Inc Aptiv PLC 
TE Connectivity Ltd 
Non-ESG SAMPLE (n= 7) 
Morgan Stanley Global Core Portfolio  HNB 




PLC ADR Comcast Corp. Cl A 
JPMorgan Chase & 
Co.  Mastercard Inc.  
Booking Holdings 
Inc.  
Apple Inc.  Taiwan 
Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Co. 
Ltd. ADR  
VMware Inc.  
Nippon Telegraph & 
Telephone Corp. 
ADR 
iShares Core S&P 500 ETF  HNB 
Apple Inc. JP Morgan Chase & 
CO 
Alphabet Class A 
Microsoft Corp Berkshire Hathaway 
Class B 
Johnson & Johnson 
Amazon Inc. Alphabet Class C EXXON Mobil 
Corp.  
Facebook Inc. 
Neuberger Berman Large Cap Value Fund 
American Electric 
Power Co. Inc.  CME Group Inc. Cl A Exelon Corp. 
Cabot Oil & Gas 
Corp.  DTE Energy Co.  Exxon Mobil Corp. 
Centene Corp.  Equity Residential First Energy Corp 
Chubb Ltd.  
TIAA-CREF Growth & Income Fund  HNB 
Abbott Laboratories Apple Inc.  Chevron Corp. 
AbbVie Inc.  
Bank of America 
Corp.  Cisco Systems Inc. 
Alphabet Inc. Cl C Boeing Co.  Citigroup Inc.  
Amazon Inc.  
Vanguard Equity Income Fund Investor Shares  HNB 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co.  Coca-Cola Co. Eli Lilly & Co. 
Caterpillar Inc.  Comcast Corp. Cl A Exxon Mobil Corp. 
Chevron Corp.  DowDuPont Inc.  Intel Corp.  
Cisco Systems Inc.  
Vanguard 500 S&P IndexHNB 
Microsoft Corp Johnson & Johnson Facebook Inc A 
2020] BUYER BEWARE 2015 
Apple Inc JPMorgan Chase & 
Co 
Alphabet Inc A 
Amazon. com Inc Alphabet Inc Class C Exxon Mobil Corp 
Berkshire Hathaway 
Inc B 
JPMorgan Emerging Economies Fund 
Alibaba Group 
Holding Ltd. ADR 
China Merchants 
Bank Co. Ltd.  
Cognizant 
Technology 
Solutions Corp.  
Baidu Inc. ADR 
Chinatrust Financial 
Holding Co. Ltd.  
Fubon Financial 
Holding Co. Ltd. 
Catcher Tech. Co. 
Ltd.  CNOOC Ltd. 
Hana Financial 
Group Inc.  
China Const. Bank 
Corp.  
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APPENDIX III 













Vanguard FTSE Social 
Index 1 against 5 against 17 against 
Calvert US Large Cap 
Core Resp Index I 4 against 5 for 16 for 
iShares MSCI KLD 400 




proposals 0 proposals 0 proposals 
PAX MSCI EAFE ESG 
Leaders Index Instl 3 for 8 for 12 for 
iShares MSCI USA ESG 
Select ETF 1 for 9 for 11 for 
Guggenheim S&P Global 
Water 
0 
proposals 2 for 1 for 
iShares MSCI ACWI Low 
Carbon Target ETF split, 1-1
265 split, 11-1 17 for 
Calvert Global Water A 0 proposals 1 for 3 for 
Guggenheim Solar ETF 0 proposals split, 11-1 0 proposals 
 263 Many of the funds in our sample voted on management proposals to authorize political 
spending, per European regulations. As these were not shareholder proposals, we do not report 
votes on them in Table 4. 
 264 Several funds in our sample faced no relevant votes on our selected ESG issues during our 
sample period. Indeed, some faced no ESG-related proposals at all. Funds without reportable votes 
were primarily those dedicated to emerging market companies. 
 265 Split votes are reported in the format for-against unless the fund abstained, in which case 
votes are reported in the format for-against-abstention. 
2020] BUYER BEWARE 2017 
Green Century MSCI 
International Index Fund 
- Institution
0 
proposals 9 for 0 proposals 
Praxis Growth Index Fund 0 proposals 6 for 12 for 
Praxis International Index 2 against 0 proposals 0 proposals 
Praxis Value Index 1 for 6 for 9 for 
ESG 
Pax Global Environmental 
Markets Instl 3 for 9 for 7 for 
Morgan Stanley Inst 
Global Opp I 
0 
proposals 0 proposals 0 proposals 
Calvert Emerging Markets 
Equity I 
0 
proposals 0 proposals 0 proposals 
RBC Emerging Markets 
Equity I 
0 
proposals 0 proposals 0 proposals 
AB Sustainable Global 
Thematic A 
0 
proposals 1 for 3 for 
Amana Income Investor 0 proposals 0 proposals split 4-1
266 
Domini Impact 
International Equity Inv 
0 
proposals 5 for 3 for 
Eventide Gilead N 0 proposals 2 for 0 proposals 
Neuberger Berman 
Socially Rspns Inv 1 for 1 for 3 for 
Parnassus Mid-Cap 0 proposals 8 for 2 for 
Hartford Schroders 
Emerging Mkts Eq I 2 against split 2-1-4 5 against 
Amana Growth Investor 0 proposals split, 1-1 2 for 
Calvert Equity A 2 for 0 proposals 2 for 
TIAA-CREF Social Choice 
Eq Instl267 
0 
proposals 0 proposals 0 proposals 
266 The negative vote opposed a proposal to require cost-benefit analysis of political spending. 
267 Votes for TIAA-CREF Social Choice Eq Instl do not appear in the relevant N-PX report. 




proposals 3 for 1 for 
JPMorgan Emerging 
Markets Equity A 
0 
proposals 0 proposals 0 proposals 
Parnassus Core Equity 
Investor 
0 
proposals 5 for 1 for 
Non-ESG 
Morgan Stanley Global 
Core Portfolio 
0 
proposals split 1-2 4 for 
iShares Core S&P 500 ETF 10 against split 2-7 14 against 
Neuberger Berman Large 
Cap Value Fund 1 for split 6-2 split 2-2 
TIAA-CREF Growth & 
Income Fund 
0 
proposals 1 for split 2-3-5 
Vanguard Equity Income 
Fund Investor Shares 
0 
proposals split 8-3 18 against 
JP Morgan Emerging 
Markets 
0 
proposals 0 proposals 0 proposals 
